# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-084
Tuesday
1 May 1990

# Daily Report
## East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-90-084* *1 May 1990*

CONTENTS

**NOTICE TO READERS:** * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.


**ALBANIA**

Alia Allegedly Survives Assassination Attempt *[POLITIKA 25 Apr]* ..... 1
Yugoslav Radio Assesses Alia Speech *[Belgrade Radio]* ..... 1

**BULGARIA**

Opposition Notes 'Trend Against Communists' *[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 30 Apr]* ..... 3
BSP: Candidate Choice Interference Not Tolerated *[DUMA 25 Apr]* ..... 3
Drivers' Protest at Yugoslav Border Noted *[BTA]* ..... 4

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

RUDE PRAVO Drops Traditional Masthead Slogan *[27 Apr]* ..... 5
Press Reflects Conflict Between Sacher, Critics *[LIDOVE NOVINY 24 Apr]* ..... 5
Parties To Have Equal Radio Airtime *[Prague Radio]* ..... 6
Slovak Democratic Party Airs Election Program *[Prague Radio]* ..... 6
World Bank Concludes First 'Mission' in Slovakia *[Bratislava PRAVDA 26 Apr]* ..... 7
Gabcikovo Project Remains Undecided *[SMENA 26 Apr]* ..... 7

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

Presidiums' Joint Statement on Border Security *[East Berlin Radio]* ..... 8
De Maiziere on Exchange Rates, Unification *[BERLINER ZEITUNG 27 Apr]* ..... 8
Trade Union Members Hold May Day Rallies *[East Berlin Radio]* ..... 10
Diestel Criticized for Stasi Dissolution Handling *[Vienna DIE PRESSE 25 Apr]* ..... 10
Minister Announces Higher Electricity Rates *[BERLINER ZEITUNG 27 Apr]* ..... 11
Republicans Barred From Municipal Election *[BERLINER ALLGEMEINE 27 Apr]* ..... 11
DIE ANDERE To Be Published Again *[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 26 Apr]* ..... 11
Antenne Brandenburg To Begin Broadcasting 6 May *[East Berlin Radio]* ..... 12

**HUNGARY**

FRG Signs Accord Dropping Visa Requirement *[MTI]* ..... 13
Economic 'Denationalization' To Accelerate in 1990 *[MTI]* ..... 13
Smallholders Party To Receive Ministerial Posts *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 13
Szuros on Grosz, 'Unburnt Documents' *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 13
News Agency Journalists Form Chamber *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 15

**POLAND**

Siwicki on Reducing Soviet Troops, Security *[PAP]* ..... 16
Dubinin on Withdrawal of Soviet Troops *[Warsaw TV]* ..... 16
USSR Differs on Bilateral Debt Statistics *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 16
Lithuanian Poles Hold Congress 22 Apr *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 24 Apr]* ..... 16
UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd Visits ..... 17
Holds Talks With Skubiszewski *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 17
Meets With Parliamentarians *[PAP]* ..... 17
Draft Treaty With Germany Submitted to 4 Powers *[PAP]* ..... 18
FRG Modifies Entry Rules for Tourists *[Warsaw TV]* ..... 19

TU Votes No Confidence in Minister Paszynski *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 19
Miodowicz, Miller, Fighting Solidarity at Rally *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 19
HIGHEST TIME Weekly Offices Attacked *[PAP]* ..... 19
Burning of Journalist's Apartment Reported *[TRYBUNA 25 Apr]* ..... 19
Agenda for 3 May Celebrations Outlined *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 20
Jaruzelski Issues May Day Statement *[PAP]* ..... 20
Socialist Parties Hold May Day Parades *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 20
Prime Minister Appoints New Officials *[PAP]* ..... 20
Mazowiecki Meets Provincial Governors *[Warsaw TV]* ..... 21
Mazowiecki Remarks on Self-Management *[Warsaw TV]* ..... 21
Geremek on Foreign Policy Principles *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Apr]* ..... 21
Citizens Polled on Foreign Policy *[PAP]* ..... 22
25 Apr Meeting Examines Katyn Documents *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Apr]* ..... 23
Balcerowicz Plan's Popularity Said Growing *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 27 Apr]* ..... 23
Walesa on Need for Economic Alternatives *[TRYBUNA 25 Apr]* ..... 24
Jaruzelski, Glemp Discuss 'Transformations' *[PAP]* ..... 25
Local Self-Government Bill Examined *[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC 23 Feb]* ..... 25
SdRP's Miller Protests Solidarity Resolution *[PAP]* ..... 26
SdRP Discusses Socioeconomic Program *[PAP]* ..... 26
On Move Toward Opposition *[PAP]* ..... 26
Electoral Commissioner on Local Prospects *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 26
Christian-Democratic Labor Party Holds Congress *[PAP]* ..... 27
Socialist Youth Union Leader Discusses Future *[TRYBUNA 25 Apr]* ..... 27
TV Head Discusses Programming, Criticism *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 19 Apr]* ..... 28
OKP on Rejection of Radio Campaigning Proposal *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 29

**ROMANIA**

Further on University Square Demonstration *[ROMPRES]* ..... 30
AFP Reports on Developments ..... 30
Iliescu Defends NSF, Views USSR, Comecon *[Rome ANSA]* ..... 31
Petre Roman Criticized for 'Imposture' *[DREPTATEA 19 Apr]* ..... 31
Jimmy Carter Asked To Monitor Elections *[LIBERTATEA 17 Apr]* ..... 32
Daily Publishes Poll on Voter's Preferences *[ROMPRES]* ..... 32
International Press Center for Elections Noted *[ROMPRES]* ..... 32
NLP Denies Involvement in Easter Demonstration *[ROMANIA LIBERA 18 Apr]* ..... 33
Students Deny Involvement in 22 Apr Rally *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 33
Agriculture Bank Allowed To Use Hard Currency *[ROMPRES]* ..... 33
Government Regulations for Travel Abroad *[ROMPRES]* ..... 33
Journalists Ask PNUC To Act Against Threats *[ROMPRES]* ..... 33
Deputy General Prosecutor Diaconescu Dismissed *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 34
Integrity of Panel of Judges Questioned *[ROMANIA LIBERA 19 Apr]* ..... 34
New Military Oath of Allegiance Published *[MONITORUL OFICIAL No. 51, 17 Apr]* ..... 34
Roman Visits Forestry Institute, Village *[ROMPRES]* ..... 35
HDUR Leaders Interviewed on Congress *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 35
Daily Prints Celac's Letter to Hungary's Horn *[ROMPRES]* ..... 36
Roman, Celac Receive Bush's Economic Adviser *[ROMPRES]* ..... 37
Iliescu Meets State Department's Schifter *[ROMPRES]* ..... 37
Iliescu on Meeting *[ROMPRES]* ..... 37
Upcoming Visits by U.S. Officials Viewed *[ROMPRES]* ..... 37

**YUGOSLAVIA**

Radio Analyzes Results of Croatian Elections *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 38
Serbian Interior Minister Discusses Kosovo *[BORBA 23 Apr]* ..... 38
Pucnik Discusses Communists, Kucan *[TANJUG]* ..... 39
Macedonian-Serbian Conflict Viewed *[DUMA 29 Apr]* ..... 39
Macedonia's Gosev Addresses Rifts in LCY *[BORBA 21-22 April]* ..... 40
Border Protest Over Currency Regulations *[TANJUG]* ..... 42

## Alia Allegedly Survives Assassination Attempt

*AU3004154990 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 90 p 2*

[A.D. report: "Was Ramiz Alia Shot At?"]

[Text] Titograd, 24 Apr—"The country of eagles" still appears to be closely protected. The news that comes from there, most often via Albanians who increasingly are fleeing their homeland, must be received with some reservations because significant things that happen in Albania are simply impossible to uncover unless it suits Albanian authorities.

World press agencies have been confirming some statements made by those fleeing from Albania about what is happening in the country with a self-imposed isolation. What is puzzling, however, is the news that has reached us, namely that there has been an assassination attempt on Ramiz Alia and that the assassin was none other than a former secretary of Enver Hoxha. The bullet allegedly only grazed Alia.

### Vacation or Defection to Paris

The shot—if there ever was one—fired by a former secretary of Enver Hoxha at Enver's successor could be considered a result of a possible disagreement between Nexhmije Hoxha and Ramiz Alia. Nexhmije allegedly wanted to go on vacation to France with Enver's sons. Ramiz Alia thought that this would be politically damaging after what had happened with socialist dynasties in other European countries. In fact, it was thought that this could be seen as a defection by the Hoxha family from forthcoming democracy. The misunderstanding allegedly turned into a conflict between the dynasty and the successor of power, Ramiz Alia, which resulted in the former secretary pulling a gun. The news, even if it were true, could hardly be confirmed at present.

There is, however, something that cannot be hidden from the world completely. These are the ever increasing number of incidents. At a soccer match in Vlore, discontent with a game turned into discontent with the regime and its guardian, the secret police—Sigurimi. The police intervened. Some people were arrested, some injured. One person died after the police intervention.

One of the slogans chanted by demonstrators was: "Down with Nexhmije Hoxha." Similar slogans were heard in Durres, where the demonstrators demanded that Communist Party of Albania Secretary Muho Asllani be replaced.

### "Long Live Alia; Down With Nexhmije"

During occasional disturbances in Elbasan, Korce, Durres, and Vlor, to which the police put an end, the demonstrators shouted: "Long live Ramiz Alia, down with Nexhmije." These slogans could also be proof of the increasingly frequent stories, even in Tirana itself, about a conflict between Enver's widow and Enver's successor, Ramiz Alia. Otherwise, it has been noticed that Albania is undergoing rapid preparations for something that is still unknown to the public. The Albanian authorities are forming new special units attached to internal affairs and border forces. Their task is to intervene quickly in case the regime is threatened from inside or outside. So, for instance, a (special) unit of 500 people was formed in a place called Baralaj near Shkoder. The aim is a quick intervention. In the past year, Shkoder became known for occasional unrests. A similar unit was also formed on Mount Tarabash.

The "defectors," as the people who are fleeing from Albania to other neighboring countries are called here, have recently been openly saying that the fuse has been ignited, and that the people are awaiting a fire that could bring democracy to Albania. Perhaps this information is not true; perhaps some of it is part of the strategy employed by the Sigurimi, which has brought from the United States its special agents Zef Shkrela, Gjet Sinistraj, and D. Elezovic, men who specialize in work against Yugoslavia. They are people who went to work in the United States with Yugoslav passports. Some unofficial sources claim that they have already been staying in the Dajti hotel in Tirana at the state's expense for some time, and that they operate from there.

## Yugoslav Radio Assesses Alia Speech

*AU2904201890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 29 Apr 90*

["Conversation" with foreign affairs commentator Dragan Petrovic on the "Sunday at 10" program; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The speech that Ramiz Alia, head of the Albanian state and party, delivered at the 10th Plenum of the Albanian Worker's Party Central Committee [CC] was at the center of world attention last week. Stressing that Albania is not ready to follow East Europe in renouncing communism, Ramiz Alia announced modest changes in the domestic sphere and more specific proposals in the sphere of Albanian foreign policy. The sphere in which no change was announced at all is the Albanian anti-Yugoslav policy. We will talk to our foreign affairs commentator Dragan Petrovic about whether the period of Albania's self-imposed and not-so-brilliant isolationism is near an end.

[Petrovic] I think that it is too early to say this in Albania's case. However, the fact is that analysts' predictions are being confirmed that in considering changes that are spreading over East Europe, Albania will opt for the so-called Bulgarian model. This means cautious reforms under the watchful eye of the party, which will dictate their depth, width, and pace in order to prevent some more stormy processes or riots.

[Words indistinct] that communism in its Marxist-Leninist form, and in Albania in the fundamentalist-Stalinist form, is still functioning, and that it is functioning best in the country of eagles; the (?crucial) battle for the fate of reforms was waged at the previous, the

ninth, plenum of the Albanian Worker's Party CC. The reformists led by Ramiz Alia won the battle and reinforced their positions in relation to the conservatives led by Enver Hoxha's widow, Nexhmije.

However, the battle is by no means over. Knowing this, Ramiz Alia stressed at the 10th plenum that he expected that the reactionary elements within the party apparatus will try to block reforms. In implementing our reforms, we are enccuntering the resistance of those elements that do not understand this course of events, he said. These elements are as dangerous as the enemy of socialism, Alia claimed.

In any case, at the 10th plenum, the reformists reinforced their positions. This enabled Ramiz Alia to propose certain specific measures to improve the economic system. These measures do not correspond to the real, catastrophic state of the Albanian economy, which has been completely exhausted by rigid adherence to the principles of self-sufficiency, autarchy. However, the very mention of the terms efficiency, self-financing, and economic and market laws has been heresy in Albania until very recently.

Albania's agriculture, which employs about 60 percent of the population, was not offered anything more inventive than a small increase in land holdings, which were partly privately owned and partly cooperatively owned. This move was forced more by big problems in supply than it represents part of some future, more permanent solution for agriculture.

[Announcer] So, concerning the domestic sphere, one could say that the Albanians are very cautious, that the changes are cosmetic. However, it appears that some qualitative changes have been made with regard to foreign policy.

[Petrovic] Yes, that is right. This is characteristic of all trends in Albania. In other words, there is a gap between what is happening in domestic and foreign policy, and regarding the process of opening up, foreign policy has always been at least a step ahead of domestic policies. Ramiz Alia positively assessed the efforts toward the reduction of tensions in Europe and the world and has announced a possibility of Albania taking part in the CSCE. He also spoke about the need for Albania to open up toward the EC. According to Alia, Albania seems to be ready to normalize relations with the superpowers. Concluding the 10th Plenum of the Albanian Worker's Party CC, Alia said that the renewal of diplomatic relations with the United States and the USSR is on the agenda. This was, of course, welcomed by both the State Department and Moscow. We have also unofficially learned that the first specific moves toward this are already being made. Regarding Great Britain, the situation is somewhat more complicated because Albania is still insisting on the return of gold as the precondition for establishing diplomatic relations.

[Announcer] Despite the announcement of all these changes, there does not seem to be even a mention of changes in relations with Yugoslavia.

[Petrovic] This is correct. Analysts have also confirmed that such changes should not even be expected and that this problem does not depend at all on the degree of possible democratization in Albania. Of course, their verbal commitment to good-neighborliness still exists, but so is clear interference in neighbors' internal relations.

The country that, after four decades of the rule of socialism, is only now introducing a Ministry of Justice and a legal profession behaves very much as a lawyer and tutor in giving advice to its neighbor as to how it should behave toward alternative movements in Kosovo. However, Albanian officials do not and, it appears, will never understand the essence of the term alternative movements. This term implies two possibilities. For them, alternative movements in Kosovo obviously represent only one possibility. Only when they resolve this confusion, which is not only a confusion of terms, will we be able to talk about good-neighborliness and full normalization of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

## Opposition Notes 'Trend Against Communists'

*AU3004145490 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Apr 90 p 9*

[Report on interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, member of the Union of Democratic Forces Coordinating Council, by Christoph von Marschall in Munich on 29 April: "Trend Against Communists"]

[Text] Bulgaria's opposition is approaching the first free elections in half a century with optimism. The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), which unites 16 parties, committees, political clubs, and ecological movements, has a good chance to snatch power from the Communist Party on 10 and 17 June and to form a government with the Alternative Socialist Party (ASP), which split from the reformist wing of the Communist Party. This was stated by Dimitur Ludzhev, member of the UDF's Coordinating Committee, in an interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. The 40-year-old historian from the Academy of Sciences in Sofia ruled out a coalition with the Communist Party. Ludzhev is one of the initiators of the Glasnost and Democracy Club, a group of dissidents established in early November 1988. The strongest forces of the opposition alliance are the Social Democrats, the Radical Democratic Party, and the reactivated Peasants Party, which was dissolved after the Communist takeover in 1947. It must not be confused with the former "bloc party" by the same name, which recently distanced itself from the Communist Party, Ludzhev said.

A survey sponsored in early March by parliament, which is controlled by the Communists, according to which the Communist Party would receive 39 percent of the vote, the UDF 15 percent, and the former loyal Peasants Party 12 percent, was described by Ludzhev as manipulated and not representative. According to another opinion poll carried out by independent sociologists and sponsored by the free trade union, the UDF is in the lead with 39 percent, ahead of the Communists with 35 percent.

According to Ludzhev, in the past few months, the opposition groups have "developed from movements that rejected all old things into real parties with democratically elected leaderships" and have controlled the reform process. Now they have 10 new newspapers. "Nevertheless, we will win the elections not because we are strong but because there is a trend against the Communists." He admitted that the reform-minded Communists in Bulgaria, who, like those in Hungary, initiated the revolution "from above," are stronger than those in comparable countries. "Our Communists were simply smarter." The deposing of head of state Zhivkov on 10 November 1989, one day after the opening of the Berlin Wall and six weeks before the fall of Ceausescu, is described by the historian as a coup d'etat that brought a lot of popularity to people like Petur Mladenov, the new party chief, and Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov. "Some real changes in the political structure and the party state" would have even increased this sympathy. This is of course only true for certain personalities while the Communist Party, of which approximately 1 million of the 9 million Bulgarians are members, is disintegrating into four or five factions. Moreover, the discovery almost every day of Communist crimes is doing it harm.

Ludzhev said he is pessimistic as far as the conflict with the Turkish minority is concerned. "This will become the biggest problems for the new government—like a second Kosovo." Referring to tactical considerations of the UDF, Ludzhev explained how precarious it is to appeal for more tolerance: "If we try to win the votes of the 1.2 million ethnic Turks, we lose at least as many votes of the Bulgarians who live there."

## BSP: Candidate Choice Interference Not Tolerated

*AU3004175190 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 Apr 90 pp 1, 2*

[Vasil Popov report: "The Socialists Will Also Support Nonparty Candidates"]

[Text] Sofia, 24 April—Rumen Serbezov stated the following at today's news conference held at the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] election campaign club: So far we have not permitted and we will not permit any interference from the top party echelons regarding the nomination of BSP candidates for the forthcoming elections. Our people are wise enough and their standards of political culture are sufficiently high so as to prevent them from voting for people who have disgraced themselves, Serbezov continued in answering reporters' questions on the subject. The party leadership should not be asked to determine whether or not a candidate is worthy of being nominated. We refuse to resume the practice of the past that we renounced ourselves.

All Socialist candidates should be proposed by the municipalities, the populated areas, and the members of primary party organizations. This is precisely where the most objective preliminary elections are supposed to take place.

No restrictions or proportional rules have been set regarding the question of which currents or factions existing within the party should be included in our party's ticket, and the same applies to the fact that no preliminary arrangements for nominating people according to their age, sex, social position, and so forth, have been agreed upon.

Rumen Serbezov also pointed out the party's intention of supporting candidates even if they are not BCP members, as long as they are distinguished personalities capable of rallying the public in a given election district, prestigious individuals who have a good reputation and are widely respected as honest and authoritative people.

Cooperation with other social forces is permitted in certain places during the election campaign, but priority should be given to candidates of the BSP platform, of course.

The Supreme Party Council is expected to play a coordinating role in the election campaign. It should ensure that an individual who is popular in several areas of the country should not be nominated for more than one district, Serbezov stressed. In such cases, the candidate in question should be notified and should have the choice of district in which he would prefer to run.

One of the questions asked at the news conference hinted at accusations against Generals Dobri Marinov Dzhurov and Atanas Georgiev Semerdzhiev for appearing at election rallies. It was explained in this connection that in our country ministers are entitled to participate in the election campaign, as long as this is not prohibited by other legislative acts—just as it is the practice in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Many people would like the BSP to totally disband and give up all its activities, Rumen Serbezov said. Nevertheless, the BSP is a real political force, regardless of whether or not they like it. Some of the people who "utterly dislike" the BSP today were not only its members and active supporters in the recent past, but also its greatest apologists, Serbezov continued. The BSP will participate in the elections as an equal partner and as one of the country's political forces. It will do everything within its power to guarantee free, democratic elections.

Questions were also addressed to Elena Poptodorova. She answered that she was appointed BSP chief on the basis of the same principle according to which a Union of Democratic Forces television spokesman was appointed.

## Drivers' Protest at Yugoslav Border Noted

*AU3004162790 Sofia BTA in English 1520 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Sofia, April 30 (BTA)—A group of Bulgarian, Soviet, Polish and Romanian citizens travelling in over 15 cars, who were denied entry in Yugoslavia because they could not prove that they were going to transit its territory, staged a protest action at the Kalotina checkpoint on the Bulgaro-Yugoslav border today. Between 10:30 a.m. and noon a private-owned Bulgarian-registered motor car drove to and fro in front of the border crossing barrier, preventing the entry of Yugoslav cars on Bulgarian territory.

The officer on duty at the border checkpoint said that the problem was of a purely customs nature although one of the motorists who were not admitted held a visa for the FRG. On the one hand, tensions are mounting due to the April 20 revision of customs regulations under which the citizens of a number of East European countries entering Yugoslavia are required to exchange 200 U.S. dollars for Yugoslav dinars without the right to exchange them back on their way out of that country. On the other hand, these citizens cannot certify that they are transit travellers because of the visa-free entry arrangements which have long been in force among East European countries.

The incident at Kalotina ended after the cars headed for other border crossings.

### RUDE PRAVO Drops Traditional Masthead Slogan

*AU3004182690*

[Editorial Report] The 27 April issue of Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech is published, for the first time, without the appeal "Proletarians of the World Unite!" in its masthead. On the same day, on page 1, RUDE PRAVO publishes a 350-word commentary by Zdenek Porybny, the paper's chief editor, which explains RUDE PRAVO's motives for "abandoning today the slogan that has accompanied our newspaper in various historical periods." The commentary, headlined "Without a Slogan," states that "the slogan has not only lost its original meaning, but it also does not express the essence of the strategy of a Communist Party that is undergoing renewal." As Porybny points out, the term "proletarian" itself has lost its meaning in today's modern society and "has become an anachronism." According to Porybny, the same is true of the term "class struggle" because "the revolutionary nature of the present does not dwell in the proclaiming of seizure of power by force but in the understanding and acceptance of the universal validity of democratic values." The appeal "Proletarians of the World Unite!" and the "pitting of one part of the human community against another," which, it implies, is also said to be incompatible with the need to give priority to the solution of the universal and global problems facing mankind. The RUDE PRAVO chief editor stresses that the removal of the slogan "does not mean that we have renounced the values of international cooperation and solidarity between all forces seeking the implementation of the ideals of a socially equitable society."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak, the daily of the Communist Party of Slovakia, through 28 April continues use the above slogan as part of its masthead.

### Press Reflects Conflict Between Sacher, Critics

*AU3004144790*

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 24 April on pages 1 and 2 carries a 750-word "jaD-Mly"-signed article entitled "No One Knows Anything." The article discusses some "mind- boggling" circumstances of the start of criminal proceedings against Jaroslav Prochazka, who was recalled from the post of deputy minister of the interior on 20 April. Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 25 April publishes several items reacting to the LIDOVE NOVINY article.

The authors of the LIDOVE NOVINY article first reproduce the CTK item on the Prochazka case. They go on to say that this CTK report is "mind-boggling for more than one reason." One of them is that "the prosecution is conducted by Major Josef Ejem, LLD, investigator of the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry's Inspection Office, rather than by the prosecutor's office. According to our information, Major Ejem until recently acted as investigator of the State Security." Another such circumstance, according to the authors, is the fact that at the news conference on 18 April, at which Jaroslav Prochazka was supposed to commit his offense of leaking an official secret, Prochazka actually revealed much less about the concept of the new secret service than Minister Sacher did before him at a news conference on 3 April: "At his news conference on 3 April, the federal minister of interior spoke at length about the concept of internal intelligence. He explained his ideas on what to do with the 140,000 former collaborators of the [State] Security and on the need to establish new intelligence contacts among citizens. When we expressed doubts about the legality of such course of action, he replied that we will not manage in the future without a sufficient network of informers because such networks exist everywhere in the world. There exist tape recordings from both Minister Sacher's news conference and from the one at which Mr. Prochazka is supposed to have committed the aforesaid criminal offense. When we compared them, we found out that Mr. Prochazka revealed much less about the concept of internal intelligence than the minister did before him. He only expressed his opposition to the unlawful practices that are deeply ingrained at the Ministry of Interior and to which we, too, have long been drawing attention."

The authors therefore voice the suspicion that the start of proceedings against Prochazka has nothing to do with the leakage of a secret but that it is "another round in the increasingly less honest battle between the minister of interior and his critics."

Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 25 April on page 1 carries a 200-word "Statement by the Ministry of Interior" on the aforementioned LIDOVE NOVINY article. The statement qualifies the article as "another deliberate attempt of some journalists to launch a media campaign in order to scandalize Richard Sacher, LLD, minister of interior of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic." The statement also denies the claim that Major Ejem used to work as investigator of the State Security and appeals to the authors of the LIDOVE NOVINY article to realize that "the dissemination of similar fabrications and lies could be used by various extremist forces for attacks, and not only verbal ones, against Mr. Ejem and members of his family."

The Interior Ministry statement is followed by a 150-word "re"- signed report, which explains why the above statement is not preceded by the customary CTK-attribution. The LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE report states that, upon an instruction from its general director, Petr Uhl, "CTK refused to send this statement to its information network, arguing that it concerns 'a conflict between the ministry and LIDOVE NOVINY, which has its own sources of information'." Commenting on this decision, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE says: "An agency which is responsible to the government and which has published in great detail all kinds of information concerning the Federal Ministry of Interior all of a sudden refuses to transmit to its customers, that is, to the press, this statement. Is this another proof of its 'impartiality'? What does the Federal Government have to say about this? Whom and which cause does CTK serve, in fact?"

In the same issue, on page 3, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 1,200- word commentary by Jan Kastanek entitled "Who Should Be Out." The commentary takes issue with the "shameful campaign which LIDOVE NOVINY has been conducting for several days now against Richard Sacher," the federal minister of interior. Kastanek accuses LIDOVE NOVINY of having launched against Sacher a "whirlwind of invectivs, allegations, denunciations, and unqualified judgments," without waiting for his written reply to the arguments of his critics, which he promised to deliver to parliament by 2 May. Kastanek refers, among other things, to Jan Dus' letter in the 20 April issue of LIDOVE NOVINY, to Jiri Hanak's commentary in the 23 April issue, and to two items in the 24 April issue—the "jaD, Mly"-signed article referred to above and Petr Uhl's commentary on Sacher's security concept. He regards these articles as part of a "directed and purposeful campaign lacking in ethics, a campaign which is, strangely enough, also rather transparent and naive." According to Kastanek, the campaign is "transparent and naive" because of its clear political motivation. As he points out, it coincides with the formation of the Christian and Democratic Union (of which Sacher's party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, forms part) and the realization of its political opponents that this alliance "could be more interesting for voters than some other political groupings had expected."

### Parties To Have Equal Radio Airtime

*LD3004165390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1400 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Each political party and group will have a total of four hours of radio airtime during the election campaign. They will make themselves heard in popular programs such as Prague's and Bratislava's "Good Morning" programs, as well as the "Roundabout" and "Spectrum" broadcast by Studio Seven, and on other programs on Prague radio. The contents of the election campaign contributions are, as in television, exclusively a matter for the political parties and groups. Vaclav Vrabec, director of central broadcasting, reporting, and coverage, told representatives of political parties and groups that the election campaign is not to be a fight; it must be a campaign for the souls of the people, for their new mentality and style of life, a fight for democracy and the education of democrats.

### Slovak Democratic Party Airs Election Program

*LD3004210990*

[Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Slovak at 1502 GMT on 30 April broadcasts an election program by the Slovak Democratic Party. The program begins an announcer saying in Czech: "You are listening to the standpoints and views of representatives of political parties and forces with which they are going into the election campaign." A Slovak announcer adds: "Their views are independent of Czechoslovak radio's standpoint and position." Another announcer then says in Slovak: "You are listening to a broadcast by the Democratic Party from Bratislava." A female announcer then says in Slovak: "Good evening, dear friends, we welcome you to the regular broadcast by the Democratic Party, which will be introduced by this signature tune in the coming weeks." There follows 10 seconds of music played on a harp. This is followed by a male voice in Slovak saying: "We address you on behalf of the party, which will go into the elections as number two."

The broadcast then goes on to recall the first free elections in 1946 and lists the parties taking part in these elections both in Bohemia and Slovakia. In May 1946 the Slovak Democratic Party scored an overwhelming victory over the communists and other parties by winning 62 percent of the votes, the female announcer points out. In order to illustrate this, Dr. Martin Kvetko, chairman of the Democratic Party, is interviewed in the studio. Dr. Kvetko recollects the "cruel, dangerous, and dramatic struggle" in 1946, because the Slovak communists thought that they would win in Slovakia, too. "However, this did not happen, and the Democrats won in Slovakia and the Communists won in Bohemia. This brought about an altogether new and critical situation in the whole state," he says. Because the communists were in charge of key sectors, they were successfully able to put pressure on the democrats and to eliminate them from public life. However, the Democratic Party survived this onslought.

"This was followed by the so-called Victorious February," the announcer says, and he then plays a recording of the Labor Song sung by a choir. Dr. Stefan Paulini, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party, adds his personal recollections of the 1948 events and the ensuring political trials which rid him of any chance to express his views and to contribute to the further fate of Czechoslovakia. "This is how the communists dealt with the members of the party, the Democratic Party, which beat them in the 1946 elections."

The next section of the broadcast deals with the post-1948 period, in which the Democratic Party was banned and when from its ruins rose the Slovak Revival Party. Its membership began to decline and, in 1963, it had a "record number" of 84 members. However, in 1968 the party experienced a period of ascent and hopes. Engineer Jozef Dubnicek, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party, sums up his recollections of spring 1968, and his own motives for joining the Slovak Revival Party. He recalls how a political group composed of young people and ready to reform the party was created within the Slovak Revival Party. But August 1968 thwarted their ideas. However, on 21 November 1989, Jozef Dubnicek defended the rights of higher education students. This was no accident, Dubnicek notes, and goes on to narrate how the Slovak Revival Party was drawing up its policy long before 17 November 1989. Peter Matos, general secretary of the Democratic Party, who was one of those who participated in drafting this policy, notes that the policy was drawn up in underground conditions. However, this policy is still being perfected both by the central bodies of the party and by the party's district and local organizations.

The announcer then goes on to read from some election leaflets of the Democratic Party. "What does the Democratic Party want? First, an objective of each action must always be man, his needs and interests, and all efforts must be aimed at his freedom and happiness. Second, it is democracy which constitutes a path toward the freedom and happiness of man. It is a path from which we must not deviate at any cost. Third, the objective of this path is once again the freedom and happiness of man living in a free, democratic, federative Czechoslovakia, which is returning to its original respectable place in Europe, to its Christian, cultural, and humanitarian traditions and to social, just, and peaceful prospects."

The thoughts of the Democratic Party on the concept of democracy are then presented. Following the general appraisal of democracy as a freedom of an individual, as a harmony, stability, and joint pursuit of ways of resolving conflicts through dialogue and cooperation, it is stated that: "Democracy is self-management of free citizens, self-management of enterprises, towns and villages, self-management of territorial units, it is a self-management of a prosperous and free society."

This is followed by a brief summary of the party's policy on women's employment. Women should be in employment only when they wish to be employed and the scope of their employment should be also determined by women alone. Employment should not compete with the upbringing of children. The calculation of women's pensions should be based on the number of children they brought up.

"So, what is the democratic party like today," the announcer asks. Dr. Kvetko, chairman of the Democratic Party, says "the Democratic Party is a party of the political center, which rejects totality, both left and right wing, and which fights against totality. It ensures the security and integrity of each citizen in personal and ownership respect alike. Its policy places great emphasis on private enterprises because by building a private sector, a medium-size enterprise economically independent from the government and state power, we shall enhance true democracy. The party therefore unites members of all strata and interests groups in the nation in order to cooperate mutually in building a democratic and prosperous Slovakia."

The announcer notes that the time allocated for the broadcast has expired and plays a recording of a song to open the election campaign on behalf of the Democratic Party. The song, sung in Slovak, urges the voters to give their votes to the democrats.

In conclusion, it is announced that the next broadcast will be on 2 May at 1455 (1255 GMT) on Bratislava radio and on 3 May at 0735 (0535 GMT) also on Bratislava radio.

## World Bank Concludes First 'Mission' in Slovakia

*AU2704183490 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Apr 90 p 2*

[CTK report from the "Briefly From Home" column]

[Text] A World Bank delegation concluded its stay in the Slovak Republic yesterday [25 April]. It was the first mission of this transnational financial institution in our country after the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic [CSFR] applied for the renewal of its membership in the World Bank, of which it is one of the founding members. The aim of the visit was to verify prerequisites for the CSFR's involvement in the work of this institution.

## Gabcikovo Project Remains Undecided

*AU3004171390 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 26 Apr 90 p 2*

["(ND)"-signed report: "Government's View on Gabcikovo"]

[Text] Bratislava—The most topical subject at yesterday's meeting of the Slovak Republic Government was the present and future of the Gabcikovo hydro project. At a regular news conference the journalists learned that the group of experts whose objective was to evaluate the threat of ecological risks during the operation of this project were unable to find a common standpoint for three months. The government, which can make a qualified decision only on the basis of expert opinion, was not able to adopt a final decision or a starting point for negotiations with the Hungarian Government. The conclusions made by the group of experts pertaining to the quantity and quality of the water at Zitny Ostrov were not identical. The group dealing with ecological aspects suggested measures which will have to be clarified and made more precise. The third group will deal with the economic impact, i.e., the loss which the Czechoslovak side would suffer due to the infraction of the international agreement with Hungary. Our knowledge should also be extended by the work done by independent expert groups from abroad.

The public calls for halting the hydro project. Yet, it is necessary to realize that the hydro project is almost finished—as was stressed by Vladimir Ondrous, Slovak Republic deputy premier. It is therefore necessary to decide upon the project's future while being aware that 15 billion korunas have already been invested, that is, almost 1,000 korunas per citizen. Today construction has been cut back. People living in the hydro project's locality point out that work is still continuing, yet it is not realistic to completely clean up the construction site, because work pertaining to the ecology and conservation of the project are interconnected.

In connection with environmental protection, the government adopted an important decision pertaining to comprehensive housing construction. It obliged the regional national committee chairmen not to permit construction of housing units without waste water cleaning stations.

## GERMAN REUNIFICATION

***Notice to Readers:*** *Reportage on German reunification may also be found in the Federal Republic of Germany section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT and pertinent sections of the East Europe JPRS Report. Third-country comment is published as available in the appropriate DAILY REPORT or JPRS publication.*

### Presidiums' Joint Statement on Border Security

*LD3004164990 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 1600 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] The Presidiums of the parliaments of the two German states today [30 April] issued a statement affirming to all neighboring states the security of the borders and espousing the principle that never again should war emanate from German soil. During their discussions in both parts of Berlin, they also came out in favor of immediately preparing identical texts of a guarantee for the Polish western border on the basis of the decision of the German Bundestag of 8 March 1990 and the declaration of the GDR People's Chamber on 12 April 1990. The Presidiums of the People's Chamber and the Bundestag thanked the people who, through their peaceful revolution, have brought the aim of German unity within grasp, and those who accompanied this process helpfully and in a balanced way. The parliamentarians feel a special responsibility for the shaping of German unity, which they want to fulfill through intensive cooperation on all levels.

### De Maiziere on Exchange Rates, Unification

*AU3004144190 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 27 Apr 90 p 3*

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Premier Lothar de Maiziere by Bettina Urbanski; place and date not given: "Unification of the Two German States Is a Common Task"]

[Text] With his government statement, Lothar de Maiziere, probably the GDR's last premier, has remained loyal to himself; among both political friends and opponents, he is considered a dedicated Christian (and) Democrat. This he has to prove now in the negotiations with the FRG. As an untrained politician, he is currently holding more in his hands than just normal government responsibility. It is the responsibility for the smaller part of a future German republic on the path toward new identity and statehood. BERLINER ZEITUNG spoke with the lawyer, whose mandate is an entire people.

[Urbanski] You briefed the cabinet on your visit to Bonn. Which problems do you consider particularly important?

[De Maiziere] I handed over to the cabinet the working paper that is to form the basis of the talks, and I described the issues that are problematic in my view. The exchange rates are only one side. Even though they are what the people in our country are currently observing with particular attention, on the other hand, the question of the credit burden for our enterprises is not unimportant either for their viability and competitiveness. Our nation's debts with the State Bank amount to over 240 billion GDR marks [M]. Housing construction, housing maintenance, and the construction of private homes have cost M107 billion. Thus, I have to think very thoroughly about what there is on the asset side.

[Urbanski] Chancellory Minister Seiters recently spoke about equal partnership with the new GDR Government. Did you feel anything of that during your visit to Bonn?

[De Maiziere] You know, we will be able to solve the entire problem of unification in a reasonable way only if we consider it as a common German task. It is not the problem of the FRG or the problem of the GDR alone. Both states have to solve it together and that in such a way that they find socially compatible and promising forms everywhere. Otherwise, we will not achieve what we want; namely, the abolition of the division.

[Urbanski] The path toward unity is to be followed via the GDR's accession to the FRG, with corresponding contractual regulations. Does the Basic Law not contradict many things that you cited as goals in the Government Statement?

[De Maiziere] We must see how big the framework of the Basic Law is. Already the accession of the Saarland in 1956 showed that one needs transitional and harmonizing regulations. In that case, the period of adjustment was up to 10 years; today some things are still different than in other laender. One also will have to reconsider the catalogue of exclusive and competing legislation.

[Urbanski] The version of the State Treaty, which has become known to the public, aims at the GDR's renunciation of all sovereign rights in financial policy, economy, and social policy even before accession.

[De Maiziere] I assume that you mean the paper that I never received and that I do not know. Another paper, the first one which I saw, contained a number of such mistakes, which are partly of a semantic nature.

In any case, we have to set down the legal provisions that are necessary to create the three unions—economic, monetary, and social union. The question of the sovereignty of the State Bank will, however, be connected with this, because we want unity with an internationally convertible, strong currency. The entire treaty would be useless if it endangered the stability of this currency. Then the effects would be highly unfavorable on both sides.

[Urbanski] According to what has become known to date, monetary union means a 1:1 exchange for wages and pensions only from the outside. It comes close to the 2:1 proposal of the Bundesbank, if one assumes that

there are not to be any subsidies anymore. This would affect in particular some pensioners, mainly those who do not fulfill the conditions of the FRG Pension Law, and people with low incomes.

[De Maiziere] First of all, we have to assume that the FRG Pension Law is far more oriented toward performance than our pension system has been so far, even though the minimum pensions which we had were improved a bit by subsidies.

Furthermore, I would like to cite two issues.

First, subsidies will not be eliminated completely. We proceed from the premise that rents, energy, and public rates will continue to be subsidized. These costs can be raised only to the extent to which the efficiency and productivity in our country increases so that wages increase and thus, parallel to the wages, pensions also rise as a result of dynamic adjustment.

The second issue is that we have to take great care how we create compensation for subsidies at the lower social margin. We will not be able to do this in the way the roundtable wanted. Then the subsidies we had in the past would again be distributed indiscriminately—this time not for goods but for people. This would ruin the effect we want to achieve. Thus, we have to find a model which supports the socially weak in this respect.

Another important aspect also has to be taken into consideration: If the debts are exchanged at a 2:1 rate, the liabilities of the enterprises, which amount to over M240 billion, will be 120 billion. Thus, the enterprises' burdens are reduced considerably. Someone building a private home, who has debts of M60,000, also would have to pay back only 30,000.

Whoever wants everything to be exchanged at a 1:1 rate speaks against his own interests, because our liabilities are clearly above our assets.

[Urbanski] Our economy is partly in a miserable state. At the same time, we ourselves are organizing unemployment without absolute necessity. Don't enterprises need a certain protection or a guideline?

[De Maiziere] First, we need the pressure of the market to make our enterprises efficient. We have to take care that we alleviate the pressure in such a way that there will not be a total collapse. However, there will also be enterprises that will not function any longer. In a market economy the market, the customer, and the consumer determine what is produced, and not the producer. In our country it often was the other way round. Now, the other side of the coin is that some economic managers are relying on completely wrong things. Instead of truly serious efforts to achieve efficiency and to change the profile, they are trying to simply slim down the staff. In some areas there are anarchic phenomena, this is correct.

[Urbanski] At the moment I do not see a constitutional basis for negotiations with the FRG for accession, because the old Constitution has been undermined. Could the draft of the roundtable with corresponding modifications form a constitutional basis for these talks?

[De Maiziere] Contrary to the claims of its fathers, the draft constitution is not the ideal, compatible instrument to promote negotiations for accession. We are in the process of considering how we can solve this constitutional problem. I do not think that the draft is suitable in its current version.

[Urbanski] In an earlier interview you said that the foreign policy questions are the ones that are most difficult to solve. This is being confirmed; for instance, alliance membership is still unclear, the interests of the Allies have to be taken into consideration. Do you see any possibilities now to embed German unification into the European process?

[De Maiziere] I said what I think about this in the Government Statement. The results of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations will show how the goal of a European security system—regardless of what it will be called then—can be achieved. This cannot be assessed at the beginning. So far, only the procedures have been discussed within the framework of the Two-Plus-Four talks, specific issue have not yet been clarified. I think that—even though journalists often hold different views—negotiations are rather strained than made easier by citing firm negotiating goals.

[Urbanski] Does this also apply to the negotiations with the FRG?

[De Maiziere] It is not very helpful for any negotiations to set things down so firmly in advance that no leeway is left. This goes for both sides.

[Urbanski] The risk of narrowing the horizon in both German states to their own navel cannot be overlooked. Are we not losing sight of the fact that our world is in great danger?

[De Maiziere] I tried to broach this dimension in the Government Statement. This was also the will of the coalition partner. I think that it is in the nature of man that he has difficulty thinking about the pain of others when he himself is suffering pain at the same time. I hope that if we solve certain problems that greatly affect the people—and quickly, if possible by summer—we will then free our eyes and minds and hearts for other things.

[Urbanski] In our country hostility toward foreigners is alarming. This is certainly connected with the lack of sensitivity toward other peoples that it was not possible to develop in the past. But are not present fears and insecurities also a reason for this?

[De Maiziere] Fear produces aggression. Aggression is always directed against the supposedly weaker person—in a completely undifferentiated and unqualified way. Even though in the past we were educated against hatred of foreigners, but, at the same time, there was no opportunity for the young people to practice what they learned. We were not a multicultural society; we just

sometimes pretended to be one. Problems that were pushed away and swept under the rug are now returning as isms. If I do not develop a sensible feeling for the nation, this is expressed as nationalism.

[Urbanski] What about political culture? During the latest People's Chamber session, there were not always only qualified statements made.

[De Maiziere] We still have to learn to refrain from bullying in all disputes concerning political views. The need to learn is equally large on all sides. The question of culture is not linked with party membership.

[Urbanski] The path toward becoming free people seems to be very difficult; this is due to the great pressure of the past. But perhaps it is also a bit due to the pressure of the Deutsche mark?

[De Maiziere] I would like to turn the question around. Do you have reliable information about how many people want the Deutsche mark? Experience shows that those who do not want something speak up more frequently and more loudly. The same people, who exchanged their money for years at 1:5 or 1:7 on the black market or paid M20 for one Deutsche mark in West Berlin some weeks ago, now find 2:1 unacceptable for savings that go beyond a certain limit. They seem to have completely forgotten the higher purchasing power of the Deutsche mark. Apart from that, the limit of the 2:1 exchange rate for savings has to be discussed, of course.

[Urbanski] Does the fact that the people have become aware of themselves also include national identity, in your view?

[De Maiziere] I think that the people have become aware of themselves in the sense that they themselves determine the path they want to follow. And the path that everyone wants is the path of German unity. The question certainly is the speed and the nature of the path. Therein lie the differences.

If we think back: On 15 December, we said at our special party congress that we were striving for German unity. Everyone, without exception, reacted with terrible shock. In February, then Premier Modrow sang the song of Germany, united fatherland. Thus, in the meantime, the goals are the same, but the approaches are different.

There are people who believe that 9 November was the day to build an ideal country for the year 2020. I think that they lack the necessary sense of reality. We have to act on the basis of what we have, which is what we took over.

[Urbanski] Now there is the probably unique chance to create a new German republic—a republic that preserves what is positive and, at the same time, admits all its past.

[De Maiziere] I see economic, monetary, and social union not only as the task of one or the other, but as a historic, common task. In the Government Statement I made very clear what we have to contribute and what we want to preserve. When two go together and want to live together, they have to adjust to each other. Recently I have missed what could be called looking forward.

## Trade Union Members Hold May Day Rallies

*LD0105083590 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 0700 GMT 1 May 90*

[Text] Today [1 May] the member trade unions of the Free German Trade Union Federation are holding May Day demonstrations under the motto: For democracy, a state based on the rule of law and social security. At 1100 [0900 GMT], working people from both parts of Berlin will meet for the first time since 1946. They will attend a rally in front of the Reichstag. East Berlin participants are currently gathering at the Lustgarten. They will later march to the Brandenburg Gate.

## Diestel Criticized for Stasi Dissolution Handling

*AU3004160890 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 25 Apr 90 p 4*

[Ewald Koenig report: "I Do Not Know What is Going On"]

[Text] Berlin—The efforts to completely disband the Stasi [State Security Service] apparatus in the GDR might suffer a serious setback. Obviously there will be a break between new Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel (German Social Union) and Werner Fischer, head of the citizens' committees. Diestel wants to deprive the citizens' committees of power, but Fischer is not willing to serve in an advisory body as a fig leaf. "For a week I have not known what is going on," the senior Stasi dissolver said with disappointment in an interview with DIE PRESSE. He announces: "I will be gone before the end of the week."

At first, Interior Minister Diestel announced that he would pay tribute to the work of the citizens' committees, which will find a historic place in the history of the GDR. At the first news conference in his ministry, Diestel linked the suspicious-sounding praise with the statement that the citizens' committees may not make any decisions anymore in the future. As of now, decisions will be made by the state; that is, by him, the interior minister.

However, one must not speak of a deprivation of power, because, as Diestel told the journalists, the citizens' committees will receive an advisory function. But this will not happen, Fischer told DIE PRESSE later. The Council of Ministers' decision, which gave the Fischer government authorization, is still valid. It is unacceptable that Diestel is acting as if the decision had already been rescinded.

Given this situation, Werner Fischer is worried about the decrease in authority, "which I cannot afford in dealing with the many former Stasi employees here."

Here, that is the former Stasi headquarters in Normannenstrasse in Berlin-Lichetenberg. Fischer proposed to Diestel a conversation to clear matters up, "but so far he has not responded." Furthermore, so far Diestel has not commented to him on the sentence in Lothar de Maiziere's Government Statement, according to which a government committee is to be established to disband the Stasi. No one knows what powers this committee will have and how it is to cooperate with a parliamentary investigation committee.

"I have the impression that the democratic control bodies, such as citizens' committees, do not have a very high reputation with Mr. Diestel," Fischer stresses. "This is a mistake. He will fall flat on his face with this, because only the members of the citizens' committees have acquired the necessary awareness of the problems, and they are the only ones who know the structural links of this secret service—at least much better than anyone who has to get accustomed to the matter first."

In this connection, Stasi expert Fischer refutes the information, which was given by the 38-year-old interior minister to the journalists; namely, that files were established not only on 6 million GDR citizens but also on 2 million FRG citizens. "I wonder where he got this figure from, since he has just assumed office. I am very surprised." Fischer supposes that Diestel is very eager to distinguish himself. "The figure is too high, in any case. Probably the real figure is only half of that, even though this is also very high."

In addition, Fischer opposes Diestel's plan to carry through all rehabilitation procedures of Stasi victims within half a year, "and then to put a final end to all Stasi matters." Within half a year, Fischer says, this cannot be dealt with. Fischer himself expects to leave Normannenstrasse. He will probably become press spokesman of the People's Chamber group of the "Alliance 90."

## Minister Announces Higher Electricity Rates

*AU0105071590 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 27 Apr 90 p 2*

[Lutz Schnedelbach report: "Higher Electricity Rates Should Help Save Energy"]

[Excerpt] East Berlin—Power plants in the GDR that are a burden for the environment are to be sold to buyers from the FRG. This should provide the required capital for the improvement of the plants.

This was announced by Karl-Hermann Steinberg, minister of the environment, nature protection, energy, and reactor safety, at an international news conference in Berlin yesterday [26 April]. He stated that the use of brown coal as an energy source will be drastically reduced by the year 2000. He proceeds from the assumption that annual production will be reduced from about 300 million tonnes to below 160 million tonnes. Attention will focus on natural gas as well as on mineral and fuel oil in the next few years. The annual import of mineral oil, for example, will increase from 17 million tonnes to 23-24 million tonnes.

Steinberg also announced price increases for electrical energy so that costs will be covered in the future and energy waste can be stopped. He announced that energy prices will probably rise to 25-28 pfenning per kilowatt hour. "However, consumers must be given the possibility of influencing their energy consumption," he added. He did not specify the date of the price increase. [passage omitted]

## Republicans Barred From Municipal Election

*AU3004140490 East Berlin BERLINER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Apr 90 p 2*

[ADN report: "Election Commission Made Further Decisions"]

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—As many as 258,501 candidates—among them 81 foreigners—are running for 119,652 mandates in 7,787 people's representations that are to be contested. This was stated by the GDR Election Commission at its session yesterday where further steps to ensure the smooth running of the municipal elections on 6 May were discussed.

The Republicans' party is not permitted to participate. Chairwoman Petra Blaess reported concerning the relevant decision of the presidium of the GDR Election Commission.

The number of functioning election committees was said to be still insufficient. Ten days before the municipal elections, only about 50 percent of the required committees have been formed, with Berlin and Neubrandenburg accounting for 70 percent.

Fear for their jobs and misgivings regarding the complicated count were mentioned, among other things, as causes for the citizens' wait-and-see attitude.

## DIE ANDERE To Be Published Again

*AU3004145290 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 26 Apr 90 p 2*

[ND report: "Third Start for DIE ANDERE"]

[Text] Berlin (ND)—With a capitalized A for anders [different], DIE ANDERE will be published in a new form and with a new layout as of Friday [27 April]. The supraregional weekly wants to continue to be "disrespectful, orientated toward the grassroots, and very well briefed." It was first published as a paper of grassroots initiatives with a weekly edition of 100,000 copies in January 1990. After having published No. six in March, the complete editorial department resigned after disputes between the publisher and the advisory board of the editors. A new editorial staff continued the work.

**Antenne Brandenburg To Begin Broadcasting 6 May**

*LD2704202190 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 1400 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Antenne Brandenburg will start broadcasting on 6 May as a statutory public radio station for the future land of Brandenburg. This was announced to the international press in Berlin today [27 April]. The regional stations to date, Cottbus, Frankfurt/Oder, and Potsdam, have merged to form the new land station with all-day programming. In a statement, the GDR radio director general announced a comprehensive reconsideration of its concepts within the German and European framework.

### FRG Signs Accord Dropping Visa Requirement

*LD3004162590 Budapest MTI in English 1450 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Budapest, April 30 (MTI)—As of May 1, the visa requirement is to be dropped between Hungary and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The relevant agreement was signed by foreign ministers Gyula Horn and Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Budapest on March 24.

Foreign Ministry head of department Tade Alfoldy told MTI's correspondent that, after Italy and the FRG, similar agreements were likely to be concluded with the Benelux states and France.

Alfoldy said he believed Hungarians would be able to travel freely practically throughout Europe in a year. He added this was only true for tourists and businessmen because the visa cancellation does not mean settlement and job opportunity in other countries.

### Economic 'Denationalization' To Accelerate in 1990

*LD3004121390 Budapest MTI in English 1124 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Budapest, April 30, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Privatisation has not really started yet in Hungary. The process of company transformations involve societies (shareholding companies and PLCS), the majority of which are not private property, Istvan Tompe, director of the state asset-handling agency, said at a press briefing.

The total value of the state assets is estimated to reach 2,000 billion Forints.

The share of foreign capital in the newly-formed companies is estimated at 10 billion Forints.

Investments by Hungarian private entrepreneurs is estimated at a mere one or two billion Forints.

Some estimates, however, put the amount invested by Hungarian private entrepreneurs at a surprising 10-20 billion Forints, but most of this money is in circulation abroad, or deposited in foreign banks.

Mr Tompe said that this year, 'denationalization' will certainly speed up.

Company assets due to be involved in this process are estimated at between 50-80 billion forints.

The process involves the transformation of state companies into share holding companies and PLCS.

Privatisation could be accelerated through private investments in agriculture, but, for the time being, adequate amounts of foreign and domestic capital are still lacking.

### Smallholders Party To Receive Ministerial Posts

*LD3004151790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] The Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], as we have already reported, has elected its new leadership, and, among other things, given its blessing to the continuation of the coalition talks. Dr. Gyula Kiss, general secretary, has spoken about the agreements reached so far with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in a telephone interview from Miskolc.

[Begin Kiss recording] We have agreed that in the coalition government, FKGP will be given the portfolio of the Agriculture Ministry [foeldmuevelesuegyi miniszterium], which corresponds to the present agriculture and foodstuffs minister. Furthermore, it will be given the portfolio of the labor and employment affairs minister. Such a ministry does not operate at present; this will probably be built on the apparatus of the present Wages and Labor Office. Beyond the two concrete ministries, the MDF has offered two state ministerial posts, which in effect would mean ministers without portfolio for the Smallholders. Also, we will probably receive four state secretarial posts in the government. One of these is the post of state secretary for internal affairs, then the post of economic state secretary, and in addition the posts of transportation and environmental protection state secretaries have been offered to the Smallholders Party. [end recording]

### Szuros on Grosz, 'Unburnt Documents'

*LD3004214590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1805 GMT 30 Apr 90*

*[Report on interview with provisional President Matyas Szuros by unidentified announcer; place and date not given]*

[Text] The hit on the book market is the volume "The Unburnt Documents," whose basic material was supplied by Janos Kadar's private archives. Karoly Grosz, one-time Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] general secretary and premier, has admitted that he handed the documents over to the editors. The scandal surrounding the book has again directed attention to Karoly Grosz. I have asked Matyas Szuros, provisional president of the republic, about the politician's true face:

[Begin recording] [Szuros] I believe that the figure of Karoly Grosz is contradictory. For this reason, you were right in phrasing the question that the matter arises of what is his true visage? Whence the irresponsibility, the surprising superficiality, the flaying about? One time he wants to arouse the fear of the White Terror, another time he is a reformer. Very contradictory, strange, and my main problem with him—and I even told him so—was that the tragedy in our country was that in the party-state, the function of the party's number one leader coincided with the category of the country's number one man. This, properly speaking, was a tragedy for us. Well,

Karoly Grosz in this position was unable to provide what a leader heading a civilized European country ought to provide.

It was mainly in Arad that I came to recognize what it was that Karoly Grosz represented, in himself, or what he really was. I should not like to be unjust in connection with him, since he is, afterall, a striking figure in Hungarian political life, but I have to say that in my view, he caused much damage to the country—not just to the party, that is another matter, but to the country. And his current conduct only confirms me in this. The way he acted in connection with the documents from Janos Kadar's safe shows a high degree of irresponsibility.

[Reporter] Allow me to interrupt here. Karoly Grosz said something which was heard on the radio; he gave a report to the Central Committee on the Imre Nagy papers, but he did not want to go over at length the endless list of names of those who were executed, who were convicted and executed on the basis of the false report, the confession by Imre Nagy. What does this sentence mean? What does this insinuation mean?

[Szuros] This means that Karoly Grosz at one of the Central Committee sessions, during the time of the MSZMP still, really outlined some documents in connection with Imre Nagy, which had come from the Soviet Union's archives. Naturally, we had not been acquainted with these earlier. It was startling, but even then, my opinion was that it was unjust, indeed political tastelessness, to bring this up.

[Reporter] And were these objectively true?

[Szuros] Yes, I did not consider the form in which this happened at the time to be correct. In the final analysis, a full picture would have to be formed of the person of Imre Nagy, and there should be as little vilification as possible in the future. However, in this case it sounded like we would rehabilitate Imre Nagy, but we should just look at who Imre Nagy really was.

[Reporter] He was said to be a KGB agent.

[Szuros] That is so. Thus, he supposedly performed certain services for the KGB. However, in Hungary there are many people who performed services for interior affairs organs. If public opinion were to know how many people might have performed such tasks at certain times, in certain situations, they obviously would be startled. For this reason, I believe that in this case, too, it is necessary to proceed with great circumspection in connection with Imre Nagy, because Imre Nagy historically is characterized by having been the number one figure of the 1956 revolution and freedom fight, the memory of which will be enacted into law by the new parliament. The origins of the current changes in many regards can be traced to 1956. So it is not all the same when and how we make certain documents known either to the leadership or the wider public.

That is the trouble now with this small volume, since there is a problem with the title "Unburnt Documents"—it appears that these were not burnt, but the others were burnt. The other thing: These documents must be made public at once; that is, many things should have been dealt with publicly. Yes, but this should not be done in such a manner that it can not be infered that the documents were stolen. And with this, it is not the publishers, or the people who obtained these, whom I am accusing—that is out of the question—but rather he who handed these over in this manner. These are serious things. These must be handled responsibly, in accordance with [word indistinct] and moral norms, as well as in a politically thought-out manner. That is what is at issue.

[Reporter] Gyorgy Aczel [ex-Politburo member, Central Committee secretary] also looked at the documents. Karoly Grosz said that (?he) planned to write Janos Kadar's book. It is not known how Gyorgy Aczel viewed these documents. To what extent did the presence and intellect of Gyorgy Aczel influence the Kadar regime? How do you see this now?

[Szuros] In essence, neither he nor Kadar broke with certain dogmas or with the requirements of the party-state or state-party, but it is indisputable that Gyorgy Aczel was one of the most cultured, well-prepared politicians of that era.

What I did not really understand about him (?right to the end); I have said that despite all his faults, and despite all the negative things that are connected with his name, I consider Janoz Kadar a great politician. I saw him often, among other politicians. He was a [word indistinct], a politician of self-taught culture, just as say, Peter Veres was in literature. But, I could never forgive him for the Rajk trial, the Imre Nagy trial, and the reprisal after this, which was really to be condemned, because apparently people were executed even in 1961. Janos Kadar also neglected the national element. He was the great spokesman of an abstract internationalism, and a great friend of the Soviet Union, but without a comprehensive foundation, because in the meantime, he neglected the national interests.

I saw this with Gyorgy Aczel too—that when we got to the analysis of the national element, or to raising this, then he rather frequently had convulsions and feared anti-Semitism coming to the fore, or rising up again. Or if the subject of Transylvanian Magyardom came up then the kind of expression he used was: We should not shoot planes carrying hostages; and so on. So, from this point of view, their positions were very close, and it was very interesting that Gyorgy Aczel was very forcefully criticized in the Soviet Union, just as others were too, but Janos Kadar stuck by Aczel right to the end. You remember of course the old 1968 corps was replaced, Lajos Feher, Rezso Nyers, and in the end Jeno Fock had the same fate. He stuck by Gyorgy Aczel to the end. So, there was something here in connection with 1956 too, which linked them strongly.

[Reporter] What linked you to Janos Kadar? For in this book entitled "Unburnt Documents" there is an Andropov letter in which he draws Janos Kadar's attention to the person of Matyas Szuros who as Central Committee secretary for foreign affairs, was saying wild things about the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. I have two questions: The first is who blew the whistle on you to Andropov, who can the informer have been? My second question is, what was Janos Kadar's reaction after the letter?

[Szuros] This was on 6 October 1983. I remember this so precisely because I have had this mentioned to me several times, and this is the day of the Arad Martyrs. I met foreign political journalists in the Journalists' Association, with the section members, Karoly (Madorki) was in the chair. Then the topics were foreign political questions; the Soviet Union, the shooting down of the Korean plane and so on. This particular conflict arose through, in all certainty, from someone going over from there to the Soviet Embassy. As an informer, he told them what had happened there. The accusation was leveled against me that I would not have shot down the Korean plane, and thus I did not agree with the policy of the Soviet Union; that my description of Gorbachev was that he not only understands what is happening in Hungary, but belongs to the category of those leaders who are in sympathy us. Therefore, in connection with Gorbachev, what they reproached me for was that I was dividing the Soviet leadership, because one understands, the other does not, one is sympathetic toward us, the other is not. At that time, truly a lot of people wrote that the Soviet leadership was not united.

So, somebody reported me. To this day, I do not know who it was. I deeply condemn informers, thus I did not look into this, but knowing the corps of foreign political journalists, I could have more or less got to the bottom of it, and one or two names—mainly one—did occur in my mind, but I did not concern myself with this. Heaven preserve me from such things.

[Reporter] So, now you watch on television as colleagues demand freedom of the press and talk about their fears.

[Szuros] Yes, look there are always some spineless people and there always have been. My basic principle is that you always have to remain honest in politics as well, and I took the responsibility for what I said then. It was very interesting—do have a look at the letters—that Andropov in his letter reported me to Janos Kadar, that these matters were incomprehensible to him, and he used other expressions as well—he did hint that he himself cannot guarantee the accuracy of this information, which came into his possession. Janos Kadar, without listening to me or doing some investigations, immediately answered Andropov, and calling me to account followed after this. Janos Kadar ordered me to present myself at his office, and talked to me very severely.

[Reporter] What did he say?

[Szuros] At the time I also raised this, suggested that: Comrade Kadar, you have such authority in the Soviet Union, you are the person who could raise the issue of the Soviet troops, in some form. So we could have some idea of what this temporariness means, how will this be, etc. He reacted by lecturing me on Hungarian-Soviet friendship, and said what a problem I caused to this ailing Andropov, when they already have so many problems. I replied in the following manner: I don't think this very ill man, head of a world power, would concern himself with such questions. This was obviously prepared for him, and he signed it, since he himself is writing [words indistinct] neither his own, nor Andropov's.

[Reporter] Don't you know what his reply was to Andropov?

[Szuros] I did not know it then, only in general terms, since I was elaborating on how I did not believe the very ill Andropov would concern himself with such a matter—obviously it was given into his hands to sign—at this point he jumped up and got very angry saying: You do not believe me. He took the two letters out of his safe waving them about saying: Here they are, look, Andropov's signature. But he did not give me the letters to read. So I only learned the exact text of both from this small volume of documents, the text of Andropov's letter and the text of Kadar's letter—what his reply was. So, this is more or less what happened, and he called me seriously to account. Following this, at the meeting of the Political Committee he also brought this up in very strong terms. And there was another question as well, the military leadership was also subject to strong criticism, so at this plenum, in the very same spirit he toke me to task again, and I must admit I was a bit intimidated, in front of all the others. Because there was lot of falsification, the information was distorted by the time it got to the Soviet leadership, by the time it got to Kadar, and so on. This exchange of letters shows what kind of relationship developed between the great Soviet Union and little Hungary—how strongly the Brezhnev doctrine was in operation. [end recording]

## News Agency Journalists Form Chamber

*LD2704135290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1200 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] The Chamber of Hungarian News Agency Journalists [Magyar Hiruegynoeksegi Ujsagirok kamaraja] has been formed in Budapest. According to the basic statutes which were adopted, the professional and interest-protection organization will take part in shaping the press activity of news agencies; it will oppose decisions which hamper the fulfilment of press freedom. The Chamber would like for MTI in the future to be under the jurisdiction of the National Assembly, and for external organs not to deal with the direct professional management of the institution.

### Siwicki on Reducing Soviet Troops, Security

*LD3004133390 Warsaw PAP in English 1205 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—"The 50,000-strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army is part of a grouping ensuring military balance in our region of Europe. That is why general solutions on its further stationing in Poland, in tune with the Polish Government stand, must be and will in the future be part of the process of the shaping of a new European security system," said National Defence Minister Gen. Florian Siwicki in an interview for the ZOLNIERZ RZECZPOSPOLITEJ Army daily.

He went on to say:

"It is possible to somewhat reduce the numerical force of these troops and their technical and supply infrastructure already now, which is allowed for by the consolidation of detente tendencies in Europe and by changes in the Soviet doctrine and giving it a fully defensive character. One should recall that we do not start from scratch. Several military units were withdrawn from Poland already last year and the withdrawal of a special task force stationing in Bialogard was planned already then to take place this year.

"Additional and concrete steps will be taken in this process now. As for the town of Brzeg, where two Soviet aircraft units are stationed, one of them will be withdrawn. The town will get about 200 flats. By the end of this year, a Soviet unit will leave facilities and areas it occupied in Torun and about 250 hectares will be conveyed to that town and it will be possible to use them to build new flats there. A helicopter regiment will leave Legnica and be moved to an airport near Kolobrzeg and helicopter squadrons stationing there will be withdrawn from Poland," Siwicki said.

He told the ZOLNIERZ RZECZPOSPOLITEJ Army paper also about the principles of the movement of Soviet troops on Poland's territory.

In a conclusion of his interview, Gen. Siwicki said:

"The Republic of Poland is most deeply interested in maintaining peace and security of our borders. The Warsaw Treaty, to observe its 35th anniversary this year, played a significant role in this area of vital importance for the nation, although there are actions in the alliance's history that cannot be regarded as positive. One cannot say that this was a transitory episode in our history but an important factor of national security."

### Dubinin on Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

*LD3004190590 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Lieutenant General Viktor Dubinin, commander of the Northern Group of the Red Army, that is, the commander of all Soviet troops stationed in Poland, told Polish television the following.

[Begin Dubinin recording, in Russian with superimposed Polish translation] A brigade from the landing and assault troops from Bialogard will be withdrawn before 1 July. During the summer we will withdraw a supersonic aircraft squadron stationed in Brzeg and a unit from Torun, where the area which we have occupied will be handed over to the city and a housing development will be constructed there.

At the same time, soldiers will be withdrawn from other Soviet Army units this year. The number of them will, therefore, decrease. It is envisaged that about 5,000 will leave Poland.

The present manpower level of the Soviet Army Northern Group is about 54,000 soldiers and at the end of the year there will be about 48,000 of them. [end recording]

### USSR Differs on Bilateral Debt Statistics

*LD3004144390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] The Soviet Union believes that Poland owes the USSR five and a half billion rubles [R]. However, the Polish side thinks that it is Moscow who, due to the work of Polish specialists and our equipment at so-called raw material construction sites, has not paid us five billion, two hundred million rubles. If we were to receive this money from the Soviet Union, and strenuous efforts are being made on our part, our Soviet debt would decrease to R300 million. Moscow also states that due to supplies of petroleum and gas to Poland at reduced prices, it has lost between two and two and a half billion rubles. We have been informed of this by Jaroslaw Sieradzki, the director of the Department for Soviet Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation.

### Lithuanian Poles Hold Congress 22 Apr

*AU2704074990 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 24 Apr 90 p 6*

[Jacek Borkowicz report: "The Poles in Lithuania Are Searching for Their Place"]

[Text] The Second Congress of Poles living in Lithuania, which was held in Vilnius on Sunday [22 April], focused on the election of a chairman. The outcome of the election affirmed the relative popularity of the current president, Jan Sienkiewicz, who obtained 197 votes (from a total of 342 delegates).

For several months now, Sienkiewicz has been criticized by some association activists, who have charged that he made a sudden policy shift to seek an alliance with the Lithuanians just before the Supreme Soviet elections. This was the immediate reason for his failure to win election in Jaszuny and in Nowa Wilejka [placenames as published] last Saturday.

Sienkiewicz's rivals for the office of the president of the Association of Poles were the USSR people's deputy and

orthodox Communist Jan Ciechanowicz, and Jan Mincewicz, who runs a Polish folk culture group and is head of the association's Vilnius chapter. In his election speech, Ciechanowicz described himself as a Soviet citizen and suggested holding a plebiscite on the creation of a Lithuanian Polish Socialist Republic that would be part of the USSR.

Ciechanowicz obtained 50 votes when the vote was held late that evening and Mincewicz received 89. The relatively modest support accorded Ciechanowicz, who is popular among Lithuania's Poles, is linked to a decline in the influence of the Communists within the association. Ryszard Maciejkianiec, who was at one time a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, decided to withdraw his candidacy when Sienkiewicz criticized those Polish leaders in Lithuania who were connected with the Communist apparatus. "They are already calling us the Red association," warned Sienkiewicz.

The chairman's attempt to halve the size of the 44-man-strong Main Board ended in a storm of protest. Led by Maciejkianiec, some of the delegates (mainly from the Vilnius region) demonstratively left the hall. Faced with the threat of a premature end to the congress, Sienkiewicz apologized to the delegates. He withdrew his suggestion to reorganize the board and appealed to the delegates to return to the hall and complete the session.

He managed to persuade them to return. This time they approved the board's original composition without there being any disagreements.

The congress expressed support "for the Lithuanian Republic's desire to recover its sovereignty as a state." It gave its backing to "the creation of a democratic, civic state governed in accordance with the rule." While expressing their approval of the Lithuanians' agreement to have Polish Television Channel 1 broadcast in Lithuania, the delegates pointed out that the basic problems experienced by Lithuania's Poles were yet to be solved. They particularly pointed to the absence of a decision on starting up courses to train teachers for Polish elementary schools and kindergartens. The call for the establishment of a Polish chair at Vilnius University has still not been met.

The association considers the establishment of a Polish Cultural Center in Lithuania to be one of its most pressing tasks. Suggestions made at the congress to the effect that the association should be transformed into a political party did not receive any kind of broader backing. Although the congress was not broken off, there continues to be a crisis in the association, and there is still a danger that a split may occur or that the association may even have to be disbanded.

## UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd Visits

### Holds Talks With Skubiszewski

*LD3004145790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Excerpt] London weather is still prevailing in Warsaw and so Douglas Hurd, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, who has been visiting Poland since yesterday, may feel at home. Today, the British minister was received by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, met Bronislaw Geremek, made at speech in the forum of the joint foreign affairs commissions of the Sejm and Senate, and conducted talks with the head of Polish diplomacy, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. At first, the ministers conducted face-to-face talks, after which, plenary talks took place for the next hour and a half. To a large degree, the talks were devoted to the issue of the unification of Germany and to preparations for the two-plus-four conference.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated that Poland and Great Britain coincided on many points regarding this issue. Warsaw also gained full support for the concept of the treaty-based regulation of Polish frontiers. London showed understanding for the Polish position that this treaty should be initialled before the unification of Germany. Much was also said about the creation of a new security system in Europe, and it was agreed that the CSCE meeting ought to be called as quickly as possible. Douglas Hurd gave his support to the concept of associating Poland with the EEC within 18 months, and, as a longer-term prospect, to Polish membership in the EEC. [passage omitted: report from London speculating that Hurd will do something about the inequitable system of down-payments for British visas by Poles. These payments, of 330,000 zloties, are not returned if the application fails. Hurd is to inspect the visa section of the British Consulate in Warsaw]

### Meets With Parliamentarians

*LD3004162290 Warsaw PAP in English 1538 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—In the morning, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd held a face-to-face talk with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. After the meeting, Hurd said their opinions were very similar and were converging.

In talks, they mainly dwelt on Germany's unification. On a conference of the six on this matter and Poland's participation in it, Great Britain supports Poland's participation in the conference when the border issue is discussed.

"We found full understanding for a final removal of the border question from the Polish-German relations, the border which Britain considers to be a part of European order," Skubiszewski said. Douglas Hurd for his part supported the Polish proposal to sign accord on Poland's association with the EC.

The plenary talks focused on bilateral relations. The British side obliged itself to restore government guarantees for credits, while the Polish side opted for a broader involvement of British firms in modernizing Polish metallurgical and mining industries.

The Polish side also raised a question of British assistance in establishing a Polish secondary school in Great Britain to be named after John Paul 2, and of bringing back to Poland the ashes of General Wladyslaw Sikorski. Hurd promised to discuss the question with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He also voiced an opinion that the bringing back of the ashes of General Sikorski should take place in a dignified manner, while respecting the will of society and Polish community in Great Britain.

At noon, Douglas Hurd went to the parliament building where he talked with leader of the Citizens' Parliamentary Floor Group OKP Bronislaw Geremek, and met with members of the Sejm and Senate foreign affairs committees.

While speaking about Germany's unification, Hurd described it as a possibly most significant change in Europe. He also opined that after unification, Germany should remain a NATO member as any alternative solution might cause entering the road of destabilization which would be the gravest threat to Europe now.

Elaborating on this Hurd said that the future danger for Europe would be not communist tyranny or divisions between the East and the West but the lack of cohesion, return to old disputes and disappointment caused by excessive expectations of reaching prosperity fast. The courage and wisdom that European countries showed in avoiding the early dangers will be needed to overcome the later ones, he added.

Answering questions by senators and deputies about a possible reduction of the Polish debt, Hurd said Great Britain saw the need to further settle the question of the Polish debt with the Paris Club. He added that the remitting of part of the debt could not be based only on friendliness towards Poland as one had to take into account a possibility of other debtor nations counting on similar settlements.

**Treaty on Polish-German Border**

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd received from Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski here today a draft treaty on the Polish- German border. This question, together with the problem of German unification, was the major topic of the talks the British guest, paying an official visit to Poland, held today.

**Meeting with Tadeusz Mazowiecki**

Hurd's meeting with Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki lasted for over an hour. The following questions were discussed: German unification, treaty settlement of Poland's border with Germany, new system of security in Europe, preparations for a summit conference of 35 CSCE countries. The guest was also interested in the course of political and economic reforms in Poland.

Asked after the meeting about his stand on the Polish proposal to initial a border treaty by both German states before their unification, Douglas Hurd told newsmen that Great Britain has to discuss the question with its allies. He added that Britain considers it essential that a formal treaty should legally bind Poland and a united Germany without delay.

**Hurd on 2+4 Meeting**

Hurd announced that next Saturday a meeting of foreign ministers will begin to work out the procedure of the two-plus-four conference. At present important preliminary discussions among the ministers are being held.

It has not been settled yet which meeting will consider the question of Polish borders, but it has been decided that Poland will be present at such a meeting.

Next will follow negotiations between Poland and the two German states leading to a treaty between Poland and a united Germany. Presently a rough schedule of meetings has been settled.

**Hurd Received by Jaruzelski**

Also today British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd was received by Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski. The two politicians assessed with satisfaction the revival in the Polish-British relations initiated by the top level meetings in Warsaw in 1988 and in London in 1989, and continued in result of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki's visit to Great Britain.

The president expressed appreciation of the British Government for its understanding and support for the reforms in Poland and Polish postulates put forward in international economic, financial and credit institutions.

While discussing the international problematique, both sides exchanged opinions on multi-lateral implications of the process of German unification. The process, carried on in tune with the will of the German nation, may become a great chance for Europe, but it may also become a source of threats, especially for Germany's neighbours, if it is not properly harmonized with shaping the new, pan-European system of security.

## Draft Treaty With Germany Submitted to 4 Powers

*LD3004224590 Warsaw PAP in English 2158 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski handed to British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd here today a note and a draft treaty on foundations of the mutual relations between Poland and a united Germany.

Also today similar notes addressed to the U.S. secretary of state and the foreign ministers of the USSR and France were submitted to U.S. Ambassador J.B. Davis, Charge D'affaires of the Soviet Union H. Sienkiewicz and Charge D'affaires of France J.F. Terral.

The submitting to the governments of the four powers, and previously to the governments of the two German states, of a draft treaty whose essence lies in the legal-international confirmation of the final character of the Polish-German border in its present shape, is in tune with the earlier announcements of the Polish Government and is connected with Poland's participation in related parts of the two-plus-four conference on Germany unification.

### FRG Modifies Entry Rules for Tourists

*LD3004203290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] At the request of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the FRG Government has examined the rules connected with the issuing of tourist visas for Polish citizens going to the FRG. It has been decided that Poles going to the FRG for a period shorter than three weeks do not have to provide certificates showing the withdrawal of the necessary amount of hard currency from their foreign currency accounts. As of June, visas for Polish citizens going to the FRG for a period longer than three weeks will only be issued after the presentation of a detailed reason or a deposit. In May the present rules still apply for tourists.

### TU Votes No Confidence in Minister Paszynski

*LD3004095290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0300 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] The Congress of the Federation of Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions of Construction Workers assessed the situation in construction, particularly housing construction, as catastrophic. A vote of no confidence was passed on the minister, Aleksander Paszynski.

### Miodowicz, Miller, Fighting Solidarity at Rally

*LD0105140390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 1 May 90*

[Text] Members and sympathizers of the SDRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], the Polish Socialist Party, and the OPZZ [National Trade Union Accord] trade unionists chose the OPZZ building for their meeting venue. Accompanied by bands consisting of railway and streetcar employees, over 10,000 people paraded to the Nike monument [in the center of Warsaw].

Alfred Miodowicz told the people who had gathered that the parade was linked with a 100-year-old tradition and that it was held under slogans demanding decent living standards. Leszek Miller said: They can take everything away from us but they will not take our dignity and honor away because there is no pluralism and democracy without them.

The course of the rally was disturbed by members of the Fighting Solidarity who were standing in front of the Holy Cross Church [in the center of Warsaw] throwing petards and smoke bombs and chanting: Commies out!. The participants in the parade shouted back: Fascists Out!

### HIGHEST TIME Weekly Offices Attacked

*LD3004184490 Warsaw PAP in English 1710 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—"Last Saturday night, youngsters armed with stones and chains attacked the office of 'THE HIGHEST TIME' weekly of the Union of Real Politics led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke," an officer on duty at the Warsaw Internal Affairs Office told EXPRESS WIECZORNY daily.

"They broke twenty window-panes, destroyed weekly's signs and posters hanging on the office's wall at 41, Nowy Swiat Street. Luckily, the windows were protected by gratings which kept out the hooligans," the daily quoted the officer as saying.

The attack took place when the union started to collect signatures in favour of carrying out a referendum on the future parliamentary elections, and two days before a congress of the Polish right-wing, convoked following an initiative of the union.

A leaflet left on the office's wall signed by the Anarchist Intercity Organization (Miedzymiastowka Anarchistyczna) read: "The government's plans speak about 6 million jobless and the unemployment benefit of 120,000 zlotys. Believe in Lech today, tomorrow is Balcerowicz. Poverty keeps destroying economy. Long live Korwin-Mikke and—his satanic verses."

### Burning of Journalist's Apartment Reported

*AU2704204090 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 Apr 90 p 1*

["Unia-Press"-signed commentary: "The Tragedy of the Jachowicz Family"]

[Text] It transpires that the fire in the apartment of GAZETA WYBORCZA journalist Jerzy Jachowicz on the night of 21 April was deliberate. His wife died as a result of it.

Jachowicz had written articles demanding that the Ministry of Internal Affairs be held to account for its activity. He believes the fire was an act of political terrorism. If so, this atrocious provocation may be the handiwork of either someone like Piotrowski—the killer of Father

Popieluszko, wanting to get his revenge on the journalist—or someone belonging to a group of extremist anti-communist maniacs intent on sparking a pogrom of Security Service employees.

If the perpetrators are from the former Security Service, they have combined criminality with stupidity. But if they are from the extreme right wing, their activity is rational, though equally criminal.

We express our indignation at this crime, and our desire that the truth be revealed honestly and quickly. The tragedy of the Jachowicz family is politically disturbing. Whoever wants Polish blood to flow for political reasons is a public enemy for Poles of every orientation because such a crime affects the calm nature of the transformations in Poland and inspires bloodshed.

### Agenda for 3 May Celebrations Outlined

*LD3004142990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] This year, we will once again be celebrating 3 May as a national day. The ceremonies at Royal Palace Square will begin at 1000 [0800 GMT]. At this time, the state flag will be raised on the clock tower of the Royal Palace. A cannon salute will also be fired. Next, subunits of the Polish Army taking part in the ceremony will march along Krakowskie Przedmiescie and Nowy Swiat. At 1100 [0900 GMT], a demonstration of parade drill and a concert of marching music, executed by ceremonial military bands, will take place. In the evening, the president of the Polish Republic, on the occasion of national day, will receive representatives of the state authorities and the diplomatic corps at the Royal Palace. The president's speech will be broadcast by Polish radio and television.

### Jaruzelski Issues May Day Statement

*LD0105012790 Warsaw PAP in English 2113 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski published today the following statement:

A hundred years ago the May Day holiday—a symbol of respect for human work and of struggle for social justice—was observed for the first time on the Polish soil. In our nation the struggle intertwined with the drive at national liberation.

The meaning of the May Day changed in step with history. But the tradition of workers' celebration of this day have been deeply rooted in our Polish customs. Let it be maintianed and let it prove the significance of honest labour for the welfare of our nation and state.

On this day I sincerely greet and wish all the best to all my compatriots, to all who contribute material and spiritual values to the motherland, President Jaruzelski stated.

### Socialist Parties Hold May Day Parades

*LD0105084590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0200 GMT 1 May 90*

[Excerpt] This year's May Day is being celebrated in Poland in totally changed sociopolitical conditions. Individual parties and political groups will commemorate Labor Day and those who fought for a better tomorrow in their own way.

However, there will be no central May Day parade as it used to be. Parades organized by some parties and social organizations including, among others, the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, the Polish Social Democratic Labor Party, the Movement of the Working People, and the OPZZ [National Trade Union Confederation] are, nevertheless, envisioned. They have planned to gather jointly in front of the OPZZ building at 1000 [0800 GMT], where a parade will set off toward the Nike monument [in the center of Warsaw].

Polish Socialist Party [PPS] representatives will place flowers today in Ogrodowa Street, where PPS activists were executed. Later they will proceed to Warecka Street, where the editorial office of the PPS ROBOTNIK [WORKER] used to be located before the war.

A parade organized, among others, by the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution will reach that destination from Konstytucji [Constitution] Square.

President Wojciech Jaruzelski will place flowers today in front of the Execution Gate of the Warsaw Citadel. He will later visit one of the Warsaw enterprises working around the clock. [passage omitted]

### Prime Minister Appoints New Officials

*LD3004174190 Warsaw PAP in English 1644 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—The prime minister has made the following changes at top state posts:

—On the motion of the minister of home market he appointed Edmund Bogdan Bubak undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Home Market.

—He recalled Janusz Maciejewicz from the post of chairman fo the Polish Committee for Standardization and Quality and appointed Krzysztof Mordzinski chairman of the committee.

Edmund Bogdan Bubak, 40, is a graduate of the Department of Law at the Warsaw University. In the years 1980-1989 chairman of the Shop Level Coordinating Committee of the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (Solidarity)] Solidarnosc of "Spolem" employees in the Mazowsze chapter and deputy chairman of the National Coordinating Committee of "Spolem" employees.

Krzysztof Mordzinski, 54, is a graduate of the Warsaw Technical University, author of a dozen or so scientific

publications from the field of meteorology. Secretary of the Warsaw Citizens' Committee "Solidarnosc" during the Sejm election campaign. Head of the secretariat of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club OKP since July 1989.

### Mazowiecki Meets Provincial Governors

*LD2704221290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Welfare benefits, organization of the labor market, and changes in the state administration were the subjects of today's meeting of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki with voivodas [voivodship governors]. The premier attaches great significance to these meetings because the government needs as much information as possible about what is happening in the country, particularly now when we are at a difficult moment of reforming the country and before the local government elections. Voivodas should cooperate well with all social forces in the provinces, but they should also remember that they are subordinate to the government. Difficult issues related to social welfare were discussed. There already are 1,407 parish social security centers. It is also the government's intention to alleviate the effects of unemployment.

### Mazowiecki Remarks on Self-Management

*LD3004145990 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1732 GMT 29 Apr 90*

[Remarks by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki at a Citizens' Committee meeting on 29 April; place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] The basic question that I often ask myself, and that I regard as a kind of test that I should often place before myself, is the question whether or not people already regard this state as their own. In what degree do they already regard this state as their own? This is a basic question. I regard these self-management elections as a great step on this road, if we win them, if we carry them through well. We will win them when people go to the elections, if they choose the best. This is not, this is not, these are not successive elections to the People's Councils, just that they happen to be ours. This is a complete change, this rally is the restoration of self-management, and so a different system of local authority, where there will be representatives of the state authority and the self-management authority, and where the point is for them to cooperate well with each other.

### Geremek on Foreign Policy Principles

*AU0105075690 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Apr 90 pp 1, 5*

[Speech by Bronislaw Geremek, leader of the Citizens Parliamentary Club, at a meeting of the Sejm in Warsaw on 26 April]

[Text] That the foreign policy being pursued by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government is a continuation of what came before with a few shifts in emphasis is an illusion and a myth.

It is an independent policy, a policy of national sovereignty that breaks with the past and breaks with what was harmful for the Polish national interest, the Polish raison d'etat, and the Polish nation. It also has to be realized that this break is one that means that now there is a complete social consensus about policy, Polish foreign policy, for the very first time. The accomplishments in foreign policy are such that we can now say with certainty that it is fully consonant with the interests of the Polish state.

Independence in relation to the Soviet Union, which manifests itself in the very concept of Polish foreign policy, in how Poland votes in international organizations, and in the decisionmaking mechanisms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a new fact that lies in the interest of Poland. The active realization of Poland's raison d'etat, which has been reflected in the call for Poland to be represented in the "two-plus-four" procedure and in all matters that affect Poland's security, has met with understanding on the part of international public opinion and has also met with understanding in both the West and the East.

The Polish foreign service's active involvement in European organizations, Premier Mazowiecki's proposal regarding a European cooperation council, and finally, the international standing of the premier and the minister of foreign affairs on a personal level are all assets for Polish foreign policy that are of fundamental importance and lend authority to the Polish state in all important situations and international contexts.

I would like to draw your attention to several issues. The first such issue is the German problem, with which our nation has had to live during its entire history. I think that we can now say that it is time to break with being entangled in that policy of fostering fear, with those past decades of the German threat as an instrument of blackmail. There is a real possibility of achieving Polish-German reconciliation and a real need for it. A quarter of a century ago, the Polish bishops issued a message that the minister of foreign affairs has cited today. It said: We forgive and seek forgiveness. This represented the most far-sighted articulation of Polish national interests.

These words meant that we forgive—although we have by no means forgotten the lessons of the 20th century—and that we seek forgiveness. The propaganda system at the time used these words as a weapon with which to fight the church and the Polish episcopate, but these words stemmed from ethical imponderabilia and from the profoundest possible understanding of the Polish raison d'etat; a raison d'etat directed toward the future.

We do, after all, think deeply and with a feeling of responsibility about the misfortunes experienced by the hundreds of thousands of Germans who were on the

territory of the Polish state at the end of the war and the first few months after it, of those who were the victims of wrongs, of their plight, and of those who abandoned their homes and were expelled. We think about the wrongs that were suffered by those who were innocent, who paid the highest, painful price for the wrongs committed by a criminal system, for the wrongs committed by criminals. They paid the price for those who brought about the most terrible war in the history of mankind, and it is a moral imperative that leads us to say this. Yes, we ask for forgiveness, we ask people to be forgiven, we ask people to forgive the wrongs.

Speaking from the Sejm podium, I would, at the same time, like to say that we do not and cannot accept having anyone tell us how to behave in this respect. It is difficult to accept the arrogance displayed by those who call and demand apologies from us. We should ask those who demand apologies from us about their responsibility for what has happened in this shameful 20th century, about their responsibility for the wrongs suffered by the Polish nation. We regard German unification as the realization of the German nation's natural right to self-determination.

We are in a position to, and have a right to, expect a clear-cut stance by the German leaders on the question of Poland's western frontier. Poland's frontier is not a problem: It is a fact. What is a problem is the form that a future Germany will take, and this affects European and world security and not just the defense of our own country's interests.

With the passing of resolutions by the two German parliaments, it is now time to realize the Polish Government's call for the confirmation of the Polish-German border by way of a Polish-German treaty and to commence work on it immediately, without waiting for Germany to be united.

Common present and historical fortunes link Poland to Hungary and to Czechoslovakia. We can and should proceed toward European structures together because the united voice of our three countries will carry much more weight than the arithmetical sum of those voices. This means the expansion of cooperation in the economic, transportation, educational and cultural, environmental, and defense fields.

In international relations, we are guided by straightforward moral imperatives. We support the struggle for respecting human rights and democratic principles in all countries. This particularly applies to the nations that are our neighbors. Some say that these are romantic illusions running counter to political realism. Yet Poland has shown that one can employ the principle of realistic and pragmatic action in practice without betraying fundamental values and abandoning aspirations of the highest order. In addition, we also cannot withhold such solidarity, because it alone creates long-term, favorable conditions for coexistence between the Polish nation and its neighbors.

Irrespective of the differing opinions and positions that exist, there is an extensive and far-reaching consensus in Polish society on the question of foreign policy. We also have a right to expect such a consensus on the basic direction of, and basic concept behind, the Polish foreign policy of the Polish parliament.

## Citizens Polled on Foreign Policy

*LD2804211190 Warsaw PAP in English 1715 GMT 28 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 28—Four fifths of the polled by the Public Opinion Polling Centre (CBOS) in the end of February said that Poland's foreign policy serves well to society and is in tune with its interests (slightly over 50 percent of the polled voiced such opinions in October 1989), the GAZETA WYBORCZA Solidarity daily reported today.

Nearly all of the polled stated that Premier Mazowiecki (94 percent) and Minister Skubiszewski (93 percent) should have considerable influence on the foreign policy. What is more interesting, 76 percent see here the role of the Sejm, 69 percent - of the senate, 63 percent - of President Jaruzelski, and 52 percent - of Solidarity leader Walesa, the GAZETA continued.

Twenty-seven percent of the polled declared their confidence in Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski and only 2 percent did not trust him. As many as 57 percent did not know him well enough to define this.

A list of the countries with which Poland should tighten cooperation is headed by the U.S. (95 percent), Great Britain (89 percent), Japan (88 percent), France (88 percent), Sweden (83 percent), Italy (83 percent). A relatively high position was taken by the FRG (67 percent), contrary to the GDR (36 percent), the daily wrote.

The eighth position, the GAZETA continued, went to Hungary (73 percent) and ninth to Czechoslovakia (67 percent), which may indicate support for the idea of the Warsaw-Prague-Budapest triangle. The three last positions were taken by Bulgaria (29 percent), Romania (25 percent), and Cuba (15 percent).

The USSR took the 11th position (61 percent), higher one than Lithuania (49 percent), not to mention the Ukraine (31 percent). However, when the polled were asked to describe their sympathies in the so-called temperature scale (from +50 to -50), it turned out that the feelings for Lithuania (+14) are warmer than for the USSR (+8), the GAZETA WYBORCZA reported.

The feelings toward the German states are the coldest: towards the FRG -6 and the GDR -11.

Most frequently the polled named the U.S. and the USSR as Poland's major allies, then followed France,

Hungary, Great Britain, and less frequently Czechoslovakia. The NATO countries were pointed by 57 percent of the polled and the Warsaw Treaty states by 37 percent, the GAZETA said.

Nearly two-thirds of the polled would vote for Poland's further membership in the Warsaw Treaty, 16 percent opted for leaving the treaty and for neutrality, and 10 percent would like Poland to leave the Warsaw Treaty and join NATO, the GAZETA WYBROCZA reported.

## 25 Apr Meeting Examines Katyn Documents

*AU0105072290 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Apr 90 p 3*

[Ryszard Malik report: "Closer to the Complete Truth"]

[Text] An important thing for which we have long waited has happened at last. Nevertheless, there is still a lot left to be done in order to fully clarify the death of thousands of Polish officers, the cream of the Polish intelligentsia. That is the general conclusion of a meeting which took place at the Belvedere Palace on 25 April. During his Soviet visit from 11 to 14 April, the Soviet leader gave President Wojciech Jaruzelski two blue folders containing documents concerning the fate of Polish officers interned in the USSR after September 1939, the first time Poland has been given access to these documents.

What do these files contain, and what is the consequence of Moscow's official confirmation of a truth which Polish society has long known? Professor Jarema Maciszewski, who was joint chairman of the Polish-Soviet mixed commission charged with investigating so-called blank spots in Polish-Soviet history, presented what he thought were the chief conclusions provided by a preliminary examination of the documents which Mikhail Gorbachev handed to President Jaruzelski on 13 April, exactly 47 years after the discovery of the Katyn atrocity. These files contain photocopies of documents that probably come from the archives of the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] Administration for Prisoners of War and Internees. They contain something that is of ultimate value for the families of the victims—a list of prisoners of war who stayed at the three camps at Kozhelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk. This list contains a total of 14,793 persons: 4,420 from Kozhelsk, 4,031 from Starobelsk, and 6,342 from Ostashkov. Other documents in these files list people whom Moscow assigned to be deported, which, as we know, meant death. The first list of 100 names, headed by that of Franciszek Nowicki, a lieutenant colonel in the reserve who was born in 1885, was dispatched from Moscow on 1 April 1940. The first lists are signed by a Soprunenko, captain of security and NKVD departmental chief, and later lists are signed by a Senior Lieutenant Khokhlov (it was standard NKVD practice for names to be signed without initials).

On the basis of these documents, one can speculate where the officers from the Starobelsk and Ostashkov camps might be buried. The murder of the officers from Starobelsk was probably carried out near the city of Kalinin (formerly Tver), whereas that of the officers from Ostashkov was probably carried out near Kharkov, in the town of Dergache. Polish society knows only about the mass grave of murdered officers from the Kozhelsk camp, and this grave is in Katyn. As for the location of the other two graves, all one can do is speculate. We still do not know who issued the order to liquidate 55 percent of the officer corps of the Republic of Poland. This contingent died not in battle, like the remaining 45 percent did, but without weapons and without mercy, by means of a bullet in the back of the head. During President Jaruzelski's visit, the Soviet side said that it would reveal further documents. It is very probable that there are archives pertaining to the first specialized department of the NKVD, which was responsible for the officers' fate.

Other speakers at the meeting emphasized the need to make these documents quickly available to the public and to researchers, and to publish them first of all in the form in which they were received, and then accompanied by the original Russian text and scholarly commentary.

The most important conclusion seems to be that furnished by Justice Minister Aleksander Bentkowski, that the Polish authorities should immediately ask the Russian authorities to begin investigations to establish the perpetrators of the murder of Polish officers. The second major issue is Professor Aleksander Gieysztor's proposal to set up a commission in order to investigate the truth about prisoner of war camps and other matters relating to the persecution of Polish citizens after 22 September 1939. Professor Gieysztor thinks the commission ought to consist of one team that would examine documents and seek witnesses from those times, one team that would investigate traces of the three camps, a legal team to examine the question of compensation on the basis of international law, and a team that would place memorials at all the massacre sites in the USSR and gather in one place in Poland, we do not know where yet, all the documents connected with the tragic events of those years.

Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz declared that this subject would be raised in the Sejm and Senate. Senator Ryszard Reiff considered it expedient to open a museum on the subject of Poles interned and murdered in the USSR at the Warsaw Citadel.

Bishop Jerzy Dabrowski, assistant secretary of the Polish Episcopate, spoke about the grief caused by Katyn and the murder of Polish officers, and recalled the need for forgiveness.

## Balcerowicz Plan's Popularity Said Growing

*AU3004113490 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Apr 90 p 2*

["Abo"-signed report: "Balcerowicz Is Holding Up"]

[Text] A recent poll of 1,500 persons conducted by the Public Opinion Research Main Center indicates that assessments of the government's economic actions are improving, said Marek Jaskiewicz of the Team for Researching Opinion on the Economy, attached to the Office of the Council of Ministers on Thursday [26 April]. Support for the "Balcerowicz Program" has increased since March (from 31.5 percent to 34.5 percent). There was also an increase in the number of respondents who thought that the program stands a chance of being realized (from 54.1 percent to 56.9 percent). The greatest increase in confidence—one of 15 percent—was registered among farmers.

With the exception of Balcerowicz (whose popularity rose by one percent to 53.4 percent), the popularity of all eight politicians (including Premier Mazowiecki, Lech Walesa, and Cardinal Glemp) whose support in society is the subject of regular research has declined. Positive assessments of the whole government's policies remain steady at about the 60-percent mark.

A greater number of people view the future positively: 50.5 percent of those polled thought that the standard of living will improve within two years (the figure for March was 42.6 percent). The results also indicated that feelings of apathy in society are slowly declining. There was a 15.3 percent increase in the number of persons who thought they are responsible for their own circumstances (46.9 percent). However, over 40 percent of those polled are not doing additional work because they have no opportunity to do so or do not want to.

Although there is growing conviction that privatization is necessary (an increase of 4.1 percent to 60.1 percent), fewer people assert that they know something about it (a drop of 7.1 percent). The number of persons who support the privatization of large enterprises is gradually increasing.

## Walesa on Need for Economic Alternatives

*AU3004140290 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 Apr 90 p 1*

[Report on interview with Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa by Krzysztof Pilawski and Zbigniew Wrobel, place and date not given: "Walesa For TRYBUNA—I Have Respect for Pilsudski"]

[Text] During the congressional discussions, the "Solidarity" National Commission chairman replied to a few questions asked by TRYBUNA journalists reporting on the second national congress of the trade union.

[TRYBUNA] According to the Public Opinion Research Main Center poll results, your popularity is declining from month to month. At the congress, however, you scored an overwhelming victory over your rivals. How do you explain this?

[Walesa] I do not want to talk about the subject of my popularity. I think that my election success confirms the relevance of the path chosen by "Solidarity." After all, it was the people from the "Solidarity" tradition and movement who secured the great breakthrough that was the "roundtable" accord and later the creation of a government led by Mazowiecki. As I have previously stated, we all come from the same tradition and, considering the fact that it falls on us to decide the extent of the costs that have to be borne by society after 45 years of communist rule and that it will have to pay an enormous price for the reform, it is not surprising to see that the popularity of all political actors is falling. Nevertheless, despite the fact that I am frequently critical of the government, I declare my support for it.

[TRYBUNA] Even union delegates to the congress have said that the union is losing its influence. Given this situation, can one expect "Solidarity" to abandon its active support for the government's economic policies?

[Walesa] I do not know what you have in mind when you speak of active support. Either one supports a program, or one does not. Without doubt it is a bad thing that we have not put forward any other alternative to the Balcerowicz program. Anyway, during the debates at the congress many a delegate had a sharp exchange of views with the minister of finances. But in order to be able to criticize, one has to have sensible counterproposals. Until now, nobody has elaborated any. I think that "Solidarity" ought to begin doing this, but it will do it in a different way than that suggested by the National Trade Union Confederation.

[TRYBUNA] From your statements at the congress, I take it that you have now changed your opinion on the subject of advisers. They have to listen to you, not the other way around. Am I right?

[Walesa] No, you are wrong, or you must have misheard me. Can one call someone who does not advise and who himself listens to other advisers, an adviser? This is nonsense. I see that you are better informed than I am. Perhaps I should listen to you, rather than you listen to me?

[TRYBUNA] You are being increasingly compared to Pilsudski. Do these comparisons have any sense? With which Polish statesman in our history do you most closely identify with?

[Walesa] The person with whom I identify the closest is Marshal Pilsudski. At home I was taught to have particular respect for him. The years of silence and unjustified accusations by the propaganda of the Polish People's Republic have not altered my position. I value him not for the dictatorial tendencies that have been attributed to him, but for all the good that he did for Poland.

[TRYBUNA] One of the qualities of an outstanding politician is the ability to foresee future developments. Could you describe the scenario of events in the coming year?

[Walesa] I could, but I will not do so because many people might lose the sense of their vocation.

### Jaruzelski, Glemp Discuss 'Transformations'

*LD2704220690 Warsaw PAP in English 1930 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 27—Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski today met with Poland's primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp at the Belweder Palace to discuss the key problems for Polish society.

The president and primate spoke with respect and appreciation about the attitude of Poles who show patience and the sense of civil responsibility while overcoming the hardships and burdens of everyday life.

Referring to the recent observances of St. Adalbert's Day in Gniezno, the primate spoke about the significance which the church attaches to such values as unity in diversity, true reconciliation, and tolerance.

The president stressed the importance of national agreement and the common effort of all Poles for the deep transformations taking place in our country.

Jaruzelski and Glemp expressed confidence that the government headed by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, enjoying the tremendous trust of society, would effectively solve difficult problems facing Polish reforms.

The two stressed the role which Poland plays and should play in the process of European unification, and strengthening peace and security on our continent.

### Local Self-Government Bill Examined

*PM3004152490 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 23 Feb 90 p 15*

[J.O. article: "Self-Government Subject to Special Control"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We are about to experience a revolution in state administration: a revolution arising from the ground level and one that will be a continuing phenomenon. The practice of local self-government will force the legislative organs to engage in a continuous process of adjusting and altering the law. This means that bills passed by parliament do not have to be perfect. And indeed they are not.

The bill on local self-government contains a large number of references to other legal acts, which have not yet been passed and certainly will not be passed in the immediate future. This will restrict the independence of local self-government structures and generate juristic conflicts in which it will be unclear how and by whom they should be settled. The series of acts on local self-government was intended to serve as a miniature "parish constitution" setting out the principles of parish administration. If so, then this constitution should define the range of local self-government authority. Referring this question to other legal acts—especially those which are not yet in existence—will restrict this authority severely. The "parish constitution" should rank above ordinary acts and can only be subordinate to the Constitution of the Polish Republic.

The local self-government bill stipulates that the line separating central and self-government administration is to be found at the voivodship level. The highest level of self-government authority is the voivodship parliament. The lowest level of central authority is the office of voivoda. However, the government is currently preparing a parliamentary bill on administrative regions (at the district level), which "should have no authority over local self-government structures." The government's intention is not the point here—the point is that regional and self-government authorities share the same area of competence within the territory of the district. As a result, regional authorities will find themselves in conflict with voivodship self-government parliaments and with parish federations.

The bill stipulates that the office of voivoda should carry statutory controlling power over self-government structures, in addition to other supervisory bodies. The exercise of such control depends, among other things, on information concerning the work of individual parishes. Regional offices will collect this information for the voivoda. And, of course, the rule is that those who have access to information also want access to power, and sooner or later they will gain such access. The controlling body should have no vested interest in the outcome of its control. Administrative power in the state is to be divided between self-government and central structures. All that lies within the former's sphere of competence will be taken away from the latter. Consequently, control over parishes should not be entrusted to state administration because curtailing the power of self-government structures increases the power of state administration. Control over self-government structures should be entrusted to administrative tribunals because they are not interested in curtailing or increasing the power of self-government bodies.

There is one other advantage of placing control in the hands of administrative tribunals. The tribunal can only intervene if there is suspicion of transgression of the law by a self-government body. The tribunal works on the principle of presupposing the "suspect's" innocence until proven guilty. The opposite is true if control over self-government structures is exercised by state administration. The latter will collect all available information on the parish's work (as stipulated in the parliamentary bill) to ascertain whether the parish self-government body does not transgress the law. In order to be absolutely sure of its findings, the state administration will want to know virtually everything about the parish's work and it will force the parish authorities to prepare voluminous reports. The result will be that parish administration will become choked with preparing paperwork and state administration will be smothered by the volume of reading matter.

The consequences of this state of affairs could be unpleasant. Information implies power, but excess of information generates chaos. Control over information will, as usual, lead to an inevitable falsification of data by parishes, which in turn will bring about a tightening of control. The end result is easy to predict. Parishes will be formally disenfranchised and informally they will reinforce their practices of law-transgression. Tribunals will be encumbered with vast numbers of cases between self-government and state administration bodies.

Control over self-government structures is to be restricted to the formal aspects of their activity and should ascertain whether their activity is lawful. And this is what state administration is supposed to decide. But in a rule-of-law state it is not the brief of state administration to decide what is lawful and what is not. It is only the state prosecutor's office and the courts which are empowered to make such decisions.

The bill on local self-government proclaims that state administration bodies are empowered to issue such decisions and allows self-government structures the right to appeal against them in court. The statutory position should be different. State administration bodies should only have the power to refer contentious cases to law courts if there are grounds for suspecting that self-government structures have broken the law.

Until now our state was weakened by the excessive power that it commanded, discrepancies inherent in its self-contradictory powers, and the inability to make proper use of its powers. A strong state is one whose administration concerns itself only with the general, principal issues and leaves all local concerns within the sphere of competence of local self-government structures. A state is strong when it can boast a strong self-government system. It would appear that the legislators responsible for preparing the parliamentary bill on local self-government do not share this view.

### SdRP's Miller Protests Solidarity Resolution

*LD2704011590 Warsaw PAP in English 0000 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 26—The resolution of the 2nd congress of the independent self-governing trade union Solidarnosc postulating not to employ in schools and other educational and cultural institutions activists of the former PUWP [Polish United Workers Party] and youth organization linked with the PUWP in the past as well as former employees of the Internal Ministry compels us to express indignation and protest, states in part a statement issued by general secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] Leszek Miller.

Demands included in the resolution stand in clear contradiction with the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the "round table" agreements, reads the statement.

### SdRP Discusses Socioeconomic Program

*LD2804222290 Warsaw PAP in English 1902 GMT 28 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 28—The Main Council of the SDRP Social-Democracy of the Republic of Poland met today to discuss its socio-economic program and its participation in upcoming local government elections.

The party stressed that the fundamental social and economic transformations taking place in Poland are not only a chance but also a threat to the interests of many groups of working people. That is why the socio-economic program of the SDRP should constitute a basis for the party's activity. This activity, owing to the logics of processes taking place in the country nowadays must increasingly be of an opposition nature.

That is why, the Main Council of the SDRP, in adopting the key directions of the socio-economic program, treats it as an alternative for the policy of the present government. Popularizing this program and discussions on its key assumptions could play a big role in SDRP Main Council agreed.

### On Move Toward Opposition

*LD3004173890 Warsaw PAP in English 1642 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 30—"We are going in the direction of opposition," General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland SDRP Leszek Miller declared during a press conference held here today.

Miller added: However, we do not treat this as political adventurism, but simply as our own point of view on numerous problems important for the nation and state and as a need to compete with other political organizations in solving those problems. It does not suit us to be a party which would be part of the system of a new national unity front, this time at Lech Walesa [as received].

We want a modern multiparty system in which the standing of respective formations would stem from social support for their programmes.

We have recently presented an economic programme alternative to that of the government, stressed Miller and added that the SDRP is in favour of speeded-up parliamentary elections. It seems that the best date for such elections would be spring of next year.

### Electoral Commissioner on Local Prospects

*LD3004202390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] After the first round of the election campaign to local self-managements, a meeting took place today at the headquarters of Polish radio in Warsaw between the

general commissioner for the elections and representatives of radio and television, the citizens' committees, and political parties. Our reporter was there.

From Senator Jerzy Stepien, the general commissioner for the elections, I would ask for a summary of the first stage of the electoral campaign to the local self-managements for our listeners.

[Stepien] Nearly 190 kinds of groups taking part in the electoral campaign have declared themselves, of which around 84 have the character of parties or groups of a clear political hue. Apart from that, a whole mass of various kinds of associations and organizations have declared their candidates. We have also had to deal with the very interesting phenomenon of the creation of pre-electoral coalitions—I have counted around 35 of them in Poland, and all of this shows how this Polish democracy is being born. It is being born with difficulties but in a way that is very interesting.

[Reporter] From 2 May, a new principle for access to Polish radio and television broadcasts will be in force, at the local level of course.

[Stepien] The principle of parity has applied until now. On the other hand, at the moment, the amount of airtime will be decided by the number of candidates put forward. The proportions between the candidates put forward will simultaneously be the proportions between the specific allocated blocks of airtime.

[Reporter] The meeting at the radio and television headquarters has shown one thing—that the political parties are not prepared for the electoral campaign. This (?could) cause a certain amount of chaos on the airwaves?

[Stepien] This is not a surprise for me because the political parties, by the nature of things, are less engaged in local affairs at the moment, and are altogether more concerned with the practice of statewide politics. And it will be like this for a long time. Until the parties have built local programs, until they have gathered members and gained social support, much water will flow under the bridge. On the other hand, the citizens' committees are narrowing their field to local problems but do not want to move outside local problems at all. [as heard]

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] that there are problems with the filling of certain constituencies.

[Stepien] There are not many of these. Nonetheless, they exist. And here I would like to recall that until midnight on Wednesday, that is 2 May, one can still nominate extra candidates in those constituencies where candidates have not been nominated. This also relates to such constituencies where only one candidate has been nominated. We can still nominate candidates, and I would very much encourage this.

## Christian-Democratic Labor Party Holds Congress

*LD3004013990 Warsaw PAP in English 2154 GMT 29 Apr 90*

[Text] Warsaw, April 29—The 3rd congress of the Party of Labour debated here between April 28 and 29. After the suspension of the activity of the party in 1946 it was resumed on February 12, 1989.

The congress adopted the new name of the party—the Christian-Democratic Party of Labour. It also adopted new statutes which, in opinion of its participants, are modern and democratic. The highest authority of the party is a congress that elects a Supreme Council, main board, and chairmen of the council and of the board. The party's basic structures are circles and district organizations.

Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, counsel of defence in cases against opposition activists during the Communist rule, former soldier of the home army and active adviser of Solidarity some time ago, was elected chairman of the main board while Kazimierz Switon, one of founders of the first free trade unions in postwar Poland, became chairman of the Supreme Council.

The Congress appealed to Polish Christian-Democratic organizations operating abroad to promptly start activities aimed at unification.

The debates were attended by 272 delegates and also by representatives of international Christian-Democratic organizations, Christian-Democratic parties from Lithuania, the Ukraine and Italy.

## Socialist Youth Union Leader Discusses Future

*AU2704193590 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 Apr 90 p 3*

[Marek Rudnicki report: "Either a Strong Union or a Federation"]

[Text] At a news conference given on Tuesday (24 April), Grzegorz Ditrich, Main Board chairman of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP], said: "The ZSMP is alive. It has one-third of the members that it had when its membership consisted of about 1.5 million boys and girls."

Although it was not organized by anyone, a debate—one that is very lively by the union's standards—on how the union should operate in the future is under way. New work concepts based on greater autonomy and independence from the center are springing up in many regions—in, for example, Poznan, Katowice, Lublin, and Bydgoszcz. Asked about these "coups d'etat" by TRYBUNA, the ZSMP head said that he would like to see as many as possible.

"For the time being, until the congress, which is being planned for June or September, the union will continue to operate in its present form. There is every indication

that the version that will come out on top is the one that foresees the ZSMP becoming a federation of independent youth organizations, although there are some suggestions that it should retain its present form. A discussion about a new name for the union has also been postponed until the congress.

"It is more than likely that the union will become an organization dealing with social issues and matters pertaining to living conditions. It would like to set up a progressive democrats club, but does not want to be linked to or become an extension of any particular party. However, its members will not conceal their leftist sympathies.

"Since the beginning of the year, the union has received about 0.5 billion zlotys from various departments for specific purposes, such as, for example, cultural activities. As far as its organizational structure is concerned, the union is paying its own way through the activities of agencies, as well as by greatly reducing the number of full-time officials it employs."

## TV Head Discusses Programming, Criticism

*AU2604204190 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Apr 90 p 2*

[Anna Bikont report: "Who is Putting Pressure on the Television Service?"]

[Text]

### Free Party Political Election Broadcasts on Television

I recommend that you watch these election broadcasts. The scheme began throughout Poland yesterday—stated Andrzej Drawicz, chairman of the Radio and Television Committee [RTV] during a news conference at which the management of the RTV met journalists on 18 April.

The cost of these party political election programs will be met from the state budget's election fund. Political parties can bring along to the studios their own finished program (this has not yet happened), or alternatively they can record a simple studio program; namely, this could take the form of a direct statement to the viewers, or a discussion with an interviewer. To date, some 30 parties have indicated their desire to record a party political program for television, but only a few people turned up at our radio studios at the appointed time. Minority political groups can record their program in their own language. Television authorities have powers to stop the transmission of a political program, until a court rules otherwise, if they consider, for example, the program incites racial hatred. Some of the first declarations have already contained anti-Semitic tendencies.

### Where Is the Money to Come From?

Drawicz hopes that the reform of the television service will be completed by the end of this summer. However, the RTV board has not made any proposals regarding the number of employees it would like to make redundant. It looks like it will be a tough battle with the trade unions. The first sections to feel the brunt of the reforms has been the overmanned technical and administrative direction and "Poltel." This organization is a remnant of the dictatorial period of television and it comes from the days when the chairmen considered that they should own everything, for example, from pig farms to film studios—stated Drawicz.

The report on commercializing the second television channel submitted by the commission on commercialization headed by Krzysztof Toeplitz, was well received, but rejected. The atmosphere remains unfavorable to any projects of commercialization and this is a social fact that we have to acknowledge. This only leaves us with the traditional way out, namely, to stand outside the Ministry of Finance and beg—continued Drawicz.

There had been many offers from abroad, including offers to set up a third television channel. Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian magnate, is, among other people, very interested in this aspect. However, until the Sejm adopts the new communications bill it is not known whether the RTV would remain responsible for the third television channel or not.

### The Television Service and the Church

Answering a question from a GAZETA WYBORCZA reporter as to why the Sunday serial showing the history of the Bible had been taken off the air, RTV Deputy Chairman Jan Dworak explained that many viewers had protested that the program was an affront to their religious feelings. RTV had sent the serial to the Catholic University in Lublin for appraisal by its Bible scholars who have pronounced that, in places, the serial digresses from the current position of biblical studies. It is very likely that the serial will return, but only after it has received an accompanying commentary. The church has its own programs and there have not been any cases where the church had attempted to influence program policy. There is no standing administrative machinery for church and RTV cooperation—continued Dworak. Accusations of pornography did not come from the church hierarchy. It came from lay Catholic circles. According to public opinion polls, 25 percent of viewers think that there is too much eroticism on television, but 33 percent think there is too little.

### What We Do Not Have; What There Is, and How Much It Costs?

The RTV had not received any applications from minority political groups to make party political programs for television, although there were to be such broadcasts on radio. Programs on the arts and culture will suffer most because of the shortage of money. There will be more general discussion programs. The average cost of an hour-long television program is some 30 million zlotys [Z]. A current affairs program, for example, "Wiadomosci," costs Z56 million, a play

staged for television Z50 million, while programs like Irena Dziedzic's "Rozmowy" cost Z2 million to Z5 million.

The days when one had to compare the number of Soviet films shown to the number of American films shown have now gone and, equally, there is no more pressure from various embassies that used to compare numbers of films, for example, Czech or GDR films, being shown on television. Bowing to the preferences of the viewers, there were now more American films on television.

## OKP on Rejection of Radio Campaigning Proposal

*LD2704222590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Statement by Deputy Tadeusz Sciezko read on behalf of the Citizens Parliamentary Floor Group at Sejm session in Warsaw on 26 April—live or recorded]

[Text] Mr. Speaker! May it please the House! With reference to the debate that took place before noon today that concerned the draft law on permitting the broadcast of radio campaigning, I would like to make a statement on behalf of 84 deputies of the Citizens Parliamentary Floor Group [OKP].

We wish to inform the public that through the votes of, mainly, deputies of the former Polish United Workers Party and the former United Peasants Party, the draft law proposed by OKP deputies regarding granting permission for the broadcast of local radio programs during the campaign for self-government elections by independent radio-stations was defeated.

We are deeply concerned by this fact and we understand it as an attempt to restrict the freedom of access to information. [laughter in hall] Those voting against are representatives of those forces which for 40 years held a monopoly as far as the mass media are concerned. [applause]

### Further on University Square Demonstration

*AU3004194890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1817 GMT 30 Apr 90*

["Marathon Demonstration in University Square"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/4/1990—The peaceful demonstration in University Square continued on Monday. The number of demonstrators grew to several thousands in the evening, as reported by eye-witnesses.

Almost all the time, anticommunist, antigovernment and anti-NSF (National Salvation Front) slogans were shouted.

From the balcony of the university building various speakers, even foreign citizens passing through Bucharest, addressed the demonstrators.

A declaration was read whereby the Provisional National Unity Council is demanded to be convened and discuss the item 8 of the Timisoara proclamation.

The text of the declaration also calls on Mr. Iliescu to unsay the inconvenient appreciations he made in reference to the demonstrators in University Square. It also demands the dismissal of some dignitaries as well as public elucidation of the hot events in Timisoara, Bucharest and Tirgu Mures.

The text was presented as being signed by the "21 December" Association, the Independent Group for Democracy, the Romanian Antitotalitarian Forum, the "16-21 December" Association and the People's Alliance.

[Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian at 1700 GMT adds that "Doina Cornea addressed the participants, to whom she conveyed a message of solidarity from the Timisoara people."]

### AFP Reports on Developments

*AU3004195090 Paris AFP in English 1941 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest, April 30 (AFP)—Romania's main opposition parties threatened to boycott upcoming elections Monday as a leader of thousands of anti-government demonstrators rallying here announced he was starting a hunger strike.

Meanwhile Doina Cornea, a leading dissident under the ousted Ceausescu regime, made a vibrant appeal for non-violence to the protesters camped for nine straight days in University Square.

"Let us live without hate," she said, quoting Mahatma Gandhi, "You must convince your adversaries, not hate them".

Opposition groups, in a document sent to the interim government, said they would boycott the country's first free elections in more than four decades unless authorities stopped "organized harassment" of their campaigns.

They said their rallies had been attacked, their delegates beaten and in some cases murdered. Campaign posters had been torn down and party newspapers failed to reach their destinations.

"If the government does not take action, we will be obliged not to participate in elections", the document said.

It also called on the government to delay the elections, scheduled for May 20.

It was signed by the three major pre-World War II parties—the National Liberal Party, National Peasants' Party, and Social Democratic Party—and the smaller Liberal Democrats and Liberal Socialists.

They accused the ruling National Salvation Front of monopolizing unlimited resources left over from the Ceausescu regime. They cited funds, technical equipment, and an allegedly unchanged administration, "including the machinery of repression".

The Peasants' Party earlier said unidentified assailants had attacked six of its candidates at a rally in the north. Its presidential candidate Ion Ratiu said he was attacked by a group claiming to be from the ruling Front.

U.S. observers also have denounced physical and psychological intimidation of opposition parties.

Earlier, a leader of the mass sit-in outside the university in central Bucharest began a hunger strike in a bid to force authorities to open talks with the anti-communist demonstrators.

Between 8,000 and 10,000 people had gathered to support his campaign by late afternoon.

Dumitru Dinca, 40, declared he would eat nothing and only drink water. He suffers from a stomach ulcer and liver problems, he said, and would be monitored by doctors during the fast.

Human rights militants describe Mr. Dinca as an authentic populist leader. The pro-government press allege he abandoned his wife and four children. However Mr. Dinca says although he has no permanent residence and spends each night in a different home of "defenders of democracy", he pays his family an allowance for food.

The protesters, who have set up a village of tents on the big square, say the current government is tainted by the presence of veteran communist party members.

They want former Communist officials barred from political life for 10 years and have called on Mr. Iliescu to stand down as the Front's presidential candidate. Critics say he was too close to former leader Nicolae Ceausescu, who was deposed and executed in December.

They also want a decree that put the television under presidential control revoked.

However Mr. Iliescu has dismissed them as "hooligans" and questioned how representative they are of true public feeling.

Mrs. Cornea, whose appeal for non-violence marked the first time she had addressed the anti-government sit-in, also urged them "to be firm against Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front".

Meanwhile informed sources in the western city of Timisoara, where the December uprising began, said between 200 and 300 demonstrators had occupied Opera Square since Sunday.

An estimated 40,000 people demonstrated Sunday in Timisoara, according to Romanian radio.

A "popular demonstration" has been called in Bucharest for Tuesday, the May 1 holiday.

### Iliescu Defends NSF, Views USSR, Comecon

*AU3004162390 Rome ANSA in English 1221 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, April 30—"I consider myself a realistic politician who looks at the present, concrete situation and tries to deal with it without preconceived models or schemes" Romanian leader Ion Iliescu affirmed in an interview appearing in today's edition of the Rome daily IL MESSAGGERO.

Iliescu's remarks were in reply to charges by Romanian students that he represents only the "new face" of communism and is guilty of having betrayed last year's revolution against deposed and executed communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. For the leader of the National Salvation Front (NSF), these students are being manipulated and perhaps are unaware of this. Nevertheless, Iliescu said he did not deny his communist past and affirmed that the NSF, from an economic and social point of view, identified itself with European socialism, the modern social democrat doctrine. "I can define our platform as [word indistinct], with deep social characteristics" he said.

Iliescu then ruled out that a solution can be worked out with radical groups demanding that upcoming elections be postponed. These elections, he explained, "can [word indistinct] necessary to draw up a new Constitution, we cannot live in political and constitutional limbo".

The threat that students may occupy Bucharest's University Square, right up to the May 20 election, does not appear to phase Iliescu who affirmed that he had no fear it could become a Romanian "Tiananmen".

Asked what Romania's relations with the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Comecon [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], Eastern Europe's "common market", will be should he be elected president, Iliescu replied: "The problem of autonomy from the Soviet Union does not exist for we are already independent. We have [word indistinct] to open to the West [word indistinct] good [words indistinct] our neighbors, first among the Soviet [words indistinct]". "Nevertheless, the NSF leader did admit that Romania's economy was linked to that of the Soviet Union" from which it receives strategic [word indistinct] resources.

On relations with the Warsaw Pact, Iliescu said the NSF felt that the Pact should be reformed to "stress its political character over its military one".

Comecon, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, has now "well embarked on the process of disintegration" Iliescu affirmed, "and now only represents a framework for the exchange of experiences. It has no future and this opinion is shared by all, including the Soviet Union".

### Petre Roman Criticized for 'Imposture'

*AU2704173390 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 19 Apr 90 p 3*

[Al. Gh. Saveanu article: "Imposture"]

[Text] Mr. Roman—probably in order to achieve a shade of legitimacy—declares with nonchalance that the Romanian revolution began on 22 December 1989.

Why? Because Mr. Roman's presence among the revolutionaries in Bucharest could be proved only as of that date?!

Communist practice. Ceausescu's practices. Do not forget that Ceausescu, too, placed himself in the forefront of events in which the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] played a completely peripheral role in order to underscore his revolutionary past and, therefore, the legitimacy of being in power.

Mr. Roman does the same. This is normal: He is the son of a Communist, a cominternist who came to Romania with the Red Army. He fully benefited from the benefactions of the communist regime; a son of a farmer or worker would never have been able to study and do his doctorate in foreign countries.

Thus, in order to maintain his power, Mr. Roman wants to appear in the public's eyes as a hero of the revolution. Several times he said that he had been in the street among the students. We believe him because the students did not deny this statement.

However, from here to saying that the Romanian revolution began on 22 December 1989 is a long way.

It is the way strewn with the heroes of Timisoara, a city that was free as early as 20 December 1989. And this truth, namely that the Timisoara people, who were free on 20 December, were ready to fight—together with the Army in the area—to defend the freedom they had just

won, is also demonstrated by the CPEX [Political Executive Committee] shorthand reports whereby Elena Ceausescu gives the precious order that the city be razed from the face of the earth and that the area be plowed. The argument of the scientist of world reputation was that "we have a good demography and we can afford it!"

And Mr. Roman nonchalantly disregards these... details and holds that the revolution began on 22 December for the simple reason that it was then that ... it began for him.

But what won't people do during an election campaign?

### Jimmy Carter Asked To Monitor Elections

*AU3004135890 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 17 Apr 90 p 4*

[Letter addressed to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter "received by LIBERTATEA" from Smaranda Livescu and Gabriel Marmara; date not given]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President: We want to express our respect and great admiration for all your activities aimed at democracy and peace. The events in Nicaragua, as well as in other parts of the world, on which you have focused your actions recently, have proved to the whole world that the humanitarian spirit is stronger than any minor interests. We are writing this letter to you on behalf of the Romanian Community in Georgia, asking you politely to come to the aid of sorely-tested Romania and its people who have tried to preserve their dignity, as you very well know, from the direct contacts and help with which you honored them as President of the United States of America.

You probably know that the Romanian provisional government has planned the elections for 20 May 1990. The idea of free and democratic elections is, indeed, the most normal idea for opening the country to genuine democracy; the achievement of this desideratum is the test of fire of the anticommunist revolutionary movement in Romania. After almost half a century of communism, the people in that country cannot automatically enter a completely new system, whose mechanism is far from being known to them. Therefore, we thought to appeal to your knowledge and competence in dealing with such a complicated situation to support the Romanians' efforts to rid themselves of communist oppression.

We would like to beg you, Mr. President, to participate as a political observer in the events that have been announced. Your presence in Romania can really benefit democracy, which is trying to gain ground in our country. Moreover, we hope that your being involved in this process will give an effective impetus to democracy by explaining the mechanism of free elections and of political platforms to those who, apart from many other things, lack even the most basic mass media apparatus.

Esteemed Mr. President, we are aware of the fact that our request is a very difficult one, given the short time until 20 May (a date that should be revised should the democratic parties be unable to organize their candidacies). Nevertheless, we are sure that, after examining our request, you will find the most appropriate solution for granting effective help to a nation that has inherited long-standing democratic and cultural traditions and a civilization.

Under these circumstances, should you think that a discussion is strictly necessary to clarify certain points in our letter, we would ask you to set a date when the delegation of the Romanian Community in Georgia, on behalf of which we sign this letter, may meet you.

Sincerely, yours,
Smaranda Livescu, Gabriel Marmara

### Daily Publishes Poll on Voter's Preferences

*AU2304192590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1736 GMT 23 Apr 90*

["Whereto Does the Romanian Electorate Look?"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/4/1990—Only seven per cent of the country's citizens have adhered to a party so far, 12 per cent intend to do it, 55 per cent reject such a possibility and 26 per cent are still unresolved, writes the daily "ADEVARUL" specifying that, even if one can admit a spectacular dynamism of evolutions, namely the 12 per cent become members of a party, and the almost all 26 per cent decide to enter a political grouping or another, it is clear that more than half of the country's population is determined to be far from a party life. Such a phenomenon is also explained by the disappointment in the former regime, by a psychological inhibition to the very word "party."

However, electoral participation shows a very high indicator. Only ten per cent of the population do not know yet whom they will vote. Therefore, one month before elections, 90 per cent of the population have an electoral option. Such a fact can be explained, in the daily's opinion, by the attraction exercised by the current political diversity in the country, by the people's feeling that they can contribute now to determining the political life, and their wish for political stability which is hoped to rule over after 20 May.

### International Press Center for Elections Noted

*AU2304192790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1725 GMT 23 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/4/1990—The press department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that an International Press Centre of the Central Electoral Bureau will function in Bucharest at hotel "Intercontinental." It will ensure the accreditation of foreign and Romanian journalists, and will assist their activity during the election campaign and on 20 May when

Romania's president and parliament are to be elected. News conferences of the spokesman for the Central Electoral Bureau will also be organized.

### NLP Denies Involvement in Easter Demonstration

*AU2904204590 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Apr 90 p 3*

[Communique issued by the National Liberal Party (NLP); place and date not given]

[Text] On 16 April, Free Romanian Television broadcast in its evening "Current Events" program reportage on two demonstrations that took place that day in Bucharest.

We protest against the tendentious way in which events were presented.

First of all, the two demonstrations were not of a pro- and anti-monarchic nature, as claimed. That was only a secondary aspect of the respective demonstrations, one of which was in support of the National Salvation Front, with chants such as "Long Live Iliescu" and "We Want Iliescu," while the participants in the other demonstration chanted "Down With Iliescu" and "Long Live Timisoara."

Second, the chairwoman of an antimonarchic league claimed slanderously that the historical parties were the initiators of the second demonstration.

The NLP firmly denies any kind of involvement in organizing any demonstrations during the holy days of Easter.

We believe that days of reconciliation and peace, such as Easter, which all of us spend among our families, are not the right time for demonstrations.

As a matter of fact, we have always expressed the clear conviction that the serious political problems facing our country can only be solved through the democratic means of dialogue.

We hope that the road to our first free elections will not be strewn with such violent incidents.

### Students Deny Involvement in 22 Apr Rally

*AU2704142790 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1300 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] ROMPRES agency has received the following communique on behalf of the leadership of the Students' Free Trade Union:

In connection with the demonstration which, began on Sunday, 22 April and is continuing in University Square, the Students' Free Trade Union of the Polytechnic Institute in Bucharest informs the public that this nonpolitical organization has not been involved in any way in this demonstration.

### Agriculture Bank Allowed To Use Hard Currency

*AU2804183990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1634 GMT 28 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/4/1990—Under the governmental decision, the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry is authorized to receive and make payments in hard currency, to receive and grant credits in hard currency.

The decision empowers the Ministries of the Economy and of Finance to transfer 25 million U.S. dollars to the bank from the hard currency reserves so that it may set up its own hard currency fund.

### Government Regulations for Travel Abroad

*AU2804180190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1633 GMT 28 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/4/1990—Taking into account the proposal advanced in the 24 April meeting of the Provisional National Unity Council, the Executive Bureau of the government decided that all the Romanian citizens could pay in lei one round-trip train ticket throughout Europe this year.

In particular and exceptional situations death of a close relative, summoning in a trial, defence of patrimonial rights, participation in congresses and scientific symposia, medical treatment approved by the Ministry of Health the Romanian citizens can benefit of a second trip, by train, paid for in lei.

The necessary hard currency for these payments within Europe will be provided by the country's foreign payments balance.

### Journalists Ask PNUC To Act Against Threats

*AU2704171790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1612 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/4/1990—The Provisional Council of the Journalists' Society of Romania [JSR] has learned with great concern about the threats, event death threats, uttered against representatives of the press, reads a communique released by that professional organization. Considering that such acts are incompatible with the fundamental right to the freedom of the speech and of the press, the JSR Provisional Council stresses that they are an outcome of the poisoning of the social climate, of the degeneration of the political fight within the current election campaign and urges all political groups and decision makers to restore the climate of national conciliation so that political disputes may take place in civilized, democratic and legal conditions.

The Council of the Journalists' Society asks the government, the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council], the order-keeping bodies to take a firm attitude against any attempt or act that could prejudice the journalist's integrity.

We remind that "ADEVARUL" daily protested against the molestation of its director, Mr. Darie Novaceanu, present at an electoral meeting.

### Deputy General Prosecutor Diaconescu Dismissed

*AU2704134890 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1300 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Deputy General Prosecutor Gheorghe Diaconescu was dismissed today because he was involved in the Timisoara repression in December 1989. This position is now held by Colonel Mugurel Florescu, one of the people who was present at the trial of the Ceausescus.

### Integrity of Panel of Judges Questioned

*AU3004202690 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Apr 90 p 1*

[University Professor Dr. Mircea Stoica article: "Who Is Trying Whom?"]

[Text] The public in our country is profoundly dissatisfied by the fact that all trials up to now have been insignificant from the point of view of the responsibility of the Ceausescu regime, and implicitly of the Communist regime, for the disaster brought about in Romania through irresponsible and criminal governing.

For instance, General Andruta Nicolae Ceausescu was tried for shooting seven people (demonstrators) on 21 December 1989, as if the other victims did not exist and the repression apparatus had not participated in crushing the demonstration.

Some of these cases are steered by magistrates (judges and prosecutors) who during their careers arrested, put to trial, and demanded and pronounced harsh sentences, punishments with imprisonment, or death sentences for the so-called "political violators," the leading opponents of the Communist dictatorship. It is known that political violence was the eclusive responsibility of the courts and the military prosecutor's office, which were strongly influenced in their decisions by Securitate bodies and under the overview of the omnipotent "military section" of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Central Committee. (Those dealing with the law know very well that, in connection with such cases, information was sent both to this section and to the Ministry of Interior-Department of State Security).

Thus, we are not surprised by the attitude taken by the Supreme Court and the General Prosecutor's Office that limited the trial of the Timisoara Securitate officers only to the 16-22 December 1989 period; thus, it is impossible to ensure the complete trial of the acts of violence committed by the defendants and the administration, so as to establish the personal responsibility of each defendant and to pronounce a harsh but just sentence for the oppressors of the people. We demand that the most odious members of the apparatus of oppression, the investigators of the Securitate, militia, and prosecutor's office be brought to trial, those who tortured—psychologically, physical, and morally—people who opposed the criminal dictatorship of the Ceausescu clan, as well as their partisans, and we also demand the elimination of all investigators belonging to the aforementioned categories.

To achieve these goals, it is imperative to: 1) immediately purge all judges and prosecutors who collaborated with the Ceausescu clan and do not constitute a full moral and judicial guarantee; 2) take to court those Securitate and militia cadres who were involved in collecting and burning the corpses in Timisoara.

The justice apparatus, especially the military one, continues to maintain prosecutors and judges directly involved in the repression of the people during the tyrant's time and even before. We will quote some examples that do not exhaust the list of this category: Major General Valeriu Sitaru and Colonel Ivan Raileanu, judges at the Supreme Court; Maj. Gen. Liviu Pruna, head of the military court within the Ministry of Justice; Col. Mihai Muresan, who supervised the investigation activity of the Securitate; Teodor Vasiliu, Supreme Court president (appointed by Mr. Mazilu), former deputy section chief at the RCP Central Committee; former minister of justice and former Romanian ambassador to Stockholm.

We want to assure Mr. President Ion Iliescu that taking appropriate measures will be welcomed with great satisfaction by the whole Romanian public.

On behalf of the group: "The Front of National Liberation" (clandestine leader Academician T. Bugnariu)

### New Military Oath of Allegiance Published

*AU2604115290 Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian No. 51/17 Apr 90 p 1*

["Decree-Law No. 119 on the Content of the Military Oath" issued in Bucharest on 14 April]

[Text] The Provisional National Unity Council decrees:

Article 1. The members of the Armed Forces, who are doing their military service, no matter in what form, will take the following oath:

"I....., member of the Armed Forces, swear loyalty to my homeland, ROMANIA.

"I swear to defend my country, even at the cost of my life.

"I swear to observe the country's laws and military regulations."

Article 2. The provisions of Decree-Law No. 55/1990 on the military oath is herewith abrogated.

President of the Provisional National Unity Council
Ion Iliescu
Bucharest, 14 April 1990
No. 119

### Roman Visits Forestry Institute, Village

*AU2504191490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1826 GMT 25 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 25/4/1990—Wednesday afternoon, Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman met experts of the Institute of Forestry Research and Development at Stefanesti, near Bucharest, with whom he discussed questions related to ecology and the development of the forest stock.

Next he stopped at the place were the village of Dimieni, demolished by the old regime, is to be rebuilt. The drive of rebuilding the villages near Bucharest started at Vladiceasca, Snagov commune, demolished 4-5 years ago.

Mr. Petre Roman consulted with experts in construction and with other authorities to the end of solving, as soon as possible, all the applications of those who want to rebuild their homes.

### HDUR Leaders Interviewed on Congress

*LD2404085890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 23 Apr 90*

[Excerpts] [Unidentified reporter] Good evening. This morning we reported from Oradea that the Democratic Association of Magyars in Romania [RMDSz/Hungarian name for the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, HDUR], the largest and most important organization of Magyardom in Romania, concluded its first congress at dawn. It elected its leaders: Geza Domokos, president; Geza Szocs, general secretary; and Laszlo Tokes, honorary president. [passage omitted]

On the Saturday morning, the first day of the congress, the journalists who had gathered there began to observe what kinds of forces and political groupings could be detected among the delegates and leaders. At that time it appeared that the main forces centered aroung Geza Domokos and Karoly Kiraly. Geza Domokos was director of the Magyar book-publishers in Bucharest, Kriterion, and also acting president of the organization. Karoly Kiraly is the prestigious politician who holds one of the key positions in the current Romanian leadership, one of the vice-chairmanships of the National Unity Council. Therefore, in the conversation with him, it is understandable that there is discussion not only of the RMDSz, but also of the highest, indeed innermost, Romanian politics.

[Begin recording] [Reporter] On the first day of the congress it clearly seemed that two lines of force were represented, one of them being that of Geza Domokos, the other of Karoly Kiraly.

[Kiraly] I think that these are suppositions because it is possible, properly speaking, to talk about two lines of force if two forces compete against each other. From a certain viewpoint, I can imagine where this misunderstanding stems from, and it is from how the delegates relate to things. I know that clearly. I have been asked for a long time to take over and be president, leader of this organization. I was asked by Andras Suto, and I was also asked several times by the counties. I did not accept this. Properly speaking, this will be decided because I knew that my past [word indistinct] conflicted with the opinion of the membership, and not just with the general political mood in Romania. This is one thing.

The other thing is that I insist on what I stated two years ago, when I was interviewed by HITEL [paper of the Hungarian Democratic Forum]. I was asked if [word indistinct] and I said that it should be done by the youth, since it is theirs, and I shall not accept a position. It emerged that I was given a slip of paper without a vote—not a green one, but a blue one. Yet this does not upset me, since that is not why I came. I came, and that is the key thing. Very many people, delegates, came over to me earlier and persuaded me that I should come and make a contribution.

[Reporter] It appears that this congress might not have really appreciated, or that it might not have tried to treat in accordance with its value the fact that in the past years, decades, to be sure, there were some people who did certain things—within the given circumstances—for Magyardom, and among these people was Karoly Kiraly, too.

[Kiraly] Not only has it not appreciated this, but it has received me coldly, for the most part, in spite of the fact that they have asked for my support, for my mediation, and it has recognized this. Yet, this is the situation. People forget things; they put everything into the past; they do not select.

[Reporter] However, it is necessary to take cognizance of one thing, that the emerging democracy does not ask for either the Communists or the reform-Communists.

[Kiraly] Yes, that is so, that is so.

[Reporter] It is very strange because four months ago everyone was hailing the fact that Karoly Kiraly gained a role so close to power. People say that you have not done enough in the past four months for Magyardom. So it is the past four months which they ask you to account for.

[Kiraly] Yes, properly speaking this reflects what exists in Romanian society—this instability, not only in economic-political structures, but in thinking, too.

[Reporter] do you feel that you have done enough for Magyardom in the past four months?

[Kiraly] Yes, well this position of vice-chairman will cease to exist. It will cease to exist in one month's time, with the elections, and through this a given institution of Magyardom will also cease to exist, because this position really was an institution.

[Reporter] Yes, that is clear to me, but I ask whether, looking back to the past four months, Karoly Kiraly feels that as vice-chairman to Iliescu he did the most possible for Magyardom, in this position?

[Kiraly] I am convinced of this; and not only am I convinced, but there are documents, too. In time, historians and researchers will discover what it was like. [end recording] [passage omitted: background interviews with delegates to the RMDSz congress, including Laszlo Zsigmond from Sfintu Gheorghe, who represents the Association of Magyar Youth Organizations, and Eva Cs Gyimesi from Cluj, followed by report on election of new leaders of RMDSz]

[Reporter] In the end, a compromise came about, regarding not only the leaders but also regarding the national headquarters. Geza Szocs became the organization's general secretary, while the national headquarters will be in Cluj. Geza Domokos, as president, will head the organization's office in Bucharest. [passage omitted] At the end of our compilation, there will be statements from the three main officials. The recordings were made at dawn today. At first you will hear Geza Domokos.

[Begin Domokos recording] The Association is new, fresh. It is setting forth only now. It has not yet shaped its guard; it would like to be rejuvenated, it would like to change. There is no means of doing so yet in the manner we would wish. We have taken a further step ahead, and I would like to believe that next year, perhaps next spring, when the congress convenes again, we will have taken a further, firm step towards the RMDSz becoming a democratic, well-articulated, and modern association. [end recording]

[Reporter] Geza Szocs, the new general secretary, follows.

[Begin recording] [Szocs] There has not yet been a precise delineation of the jurisdictions, apart from in general terms. This means that the making of political decisions will be collective, but through the Bucharest headquarters, while the elaboration of tactical leadership in accordance with strategy will take place for the most part in Cluj, and this will be under the general secretary's jurisdiction.

[Reporter] Does Geza Szocs feel that this dual solution, the fact that there are two headquarters and two leaders—a president and general secretary—really constitutes unity?

[Szocs] It is certain that they are complementary functions which supplement one another. [end recording]

[Reporter] In conclusion, listen to the person who, in light of his qualities, his sincerity, and expertise would have been chosen by every delegate, but who invariably did not want to become a politician: Bishop Laszlo Tokes, honorary president of the organization.

[Begin Tokes recording] This is a birthday, a rebirth of our Magyardom in Romania, in its political capacity. It is a great opportunity. I am not so optimistic as to put great results down on record, with the conclusion of a congress, but I feel that it has opened the opportunity for us to genuinely come into existence politically, and for us not to ask for our rights, but for us to gain them. [passage omitted: Tokes explains that he decided at the last moment to ask for a blessing for the congress, and that he feels the RMDSz must become a kind of congregation imbued with the spirit of God] [end recording]

## Daily Prints Celac's Letter to Hungary's Horn

*AU2304193090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1742 GMT 23 Apr 90*

["Official News—Romanian Foreign Minister's Letters to His Hungarian Counterpart"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/4/1990—The independent daily "ADEVARUL" rendered in its Sunday issue the three letters Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac sent to his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn on 30 January, 17 March and 11 April 1990 in answer to the letters he received from him. The commentary headlined "Dynamite Under the Dialogue Table" which accompanies the Romanian foreign minister's letters expresses regret at the fact that "the bright horizon of Romanian-Hungarian relations" after the December 1989 revolution "was short-lived" since "reflections of the past have occurred in the Hungarian Government's position" following "the wish of some political leaders in the neighbour country to benefit by the post-revolutionary power vacuum in Romania, imposing on this country such demands that no state of present-day Europe could possibly accept."

Referring to the Hungarian side's campaign against Romania, which consisted in open attacks on the Romanian people's national sentiments, in the promotion of theses of the territorial revisionism policy, of interference in domestic affairs, including claims enunciated in a tone of dictate over the structure of some Romanian institutions, the commentary notes that such a campaign also attempted to dissimulate acts running counter to diplomatic deontology, behind alleged good intentions of dialogue. Along this line, the Bucharest daily specifies that the newspaper "NEPSZABADSAG" published the Hungarian minister's letter at the end of March.

In the beginning the Romanian side considered there was no need to publish the messages the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministers sent to one another. But when the Hungarian side's stratagem became clearer owing to the promptitude of "NEPSZABADSAG," it has been necessary to publish Mr Sergiu Celac's letters of reply as they are the only way apt to accurately inform the Romanian people and prove that, while letters were exchanged between Bucharest and Budapest, the Hungarian officials were setting dynamite under the dialogue table. As a matter of fact, one of the effects of this mining of dialogue could be seen in the tragic events in Tirgu Mures last month.

In his answer to his Hungarian counterpart's first letter, Sergiu Celac expresses his willingness for a constructive dialogue, reiterating the positive way in which the Romanian leadership approached the relations with

Hungary immediately after the revolution, as well as the wish for finding out mutually acceptable solutions.

In answer to the 2 February and 2 March letters sent by Minister Gyula Horn which, as the Bucharest daily notes, were "an escalation of the Hungarian side's calumnies and accusations," the Romanian foreign minister launched an appeal for the furtherance of interchanges of views within the limits of good faith and truth, promoting the same spirit of dialogue.

### Roman, Celac Receive Bush's Economic Adviser

*AU2804165290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1419 GMT 28 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/4/1990—On Saturday morning, John Taylor, economic adviser to the President of the United States of America, George Bush, conducted talks with Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman and the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Sergiu Celac.

The U.S. guest was informed of the course of the political life in Romania, with emphasis on the wish to secure this country's openness to the market economy and new-type economic links with the world as a whole.

After the talks, Mr. John Taylor said that was an interesting, highly troubling period in Romania as the elections drew nearer. He said the United States, too, was keenly waiting for the election results, which, he said, were decisive for freedom and openness in future Romania. He also said that during his visit he could note the country's economic situation and its prospects, considering that Romania's political openness would entail openness on the economic plane. It will also be an openness to the welfare of the Romanian people, he also said adding they awaited with interest for the Romanian-U.S. economic ties to acquire a different course and develop in a true sense in the future.

### Iliescu Meets State Department's Schifter

*AU3004175290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1652 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/4/1990—On April 30 in the afternoon, Mr. Ion Iliescu, president of the Provisional National Unity Council, had an interview with Mr. Richard Schifter, assistant for human rights and humanitarian questions of the U.S. secretary of state.

A message of friendship was conveyed to Mr. Iliescu for Romania's leadership and government from the U.S. secretary of State, Mr. James Baker III.

During the interview Mr. Ion Iliescu referred to the political developments in Romania as well as to the specific ways of preparing and organizing the free elections due on May 20.

Mr. Richard Schifter expressed the U.S. Government's appreciation for the democratic process under way in Romania, as well as its belief that it would continue, that the elections would be an important moment in this process.

### Iliescu on Meeting

*AU3004184190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1741 GMT 30 Apr 90*

["Mr. Iliescu's Statement"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/4/1990—At the end of talks with the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Richard Schifter, Mr. Ion Iliescu made a statement to the news agency ROMPRES in which he stressed that the U.S. official conveyed him a "very positive and constructive letter" from Mr. James Baker. Mr. Iliescu said that the U.S. secretary of state expresses in his letter the United States' interest in the democratization process in this country, in the preparations for the May 20 elections, with emphasis on the fresh possibilities opened to the U.S.-Romanian relations. We have also learned about the U.S.A.'s readiness to meet us halfway with its political and economic experience, with the broad opportunities for growing bilateral ties, the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council] president also said.

We think Mr. Baker's letter and Mr. Schifter's visit here to be an expression of the U.S.A.'s willingness to develop relations with Romania on all planes, Mr. Ion Iliescu added.

### Upcoming Visits by U.S. Officials Viewed

*AU2704184290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1541 GMT 27 Apr 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 27/4/1990—The agenda of Romanian-U.S. relations records further contacts and visits aimed at furthering the talks on invited U.S. observers to the May 20 elections and the expansion of bilateral economic relations.

These contacts, scheduled for the days to come, include the visit of a delegation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, led by Donna Givens, deputy assistant of the department's secretary, as well as the visit of a group of U.S. expert in nuclear power engineering. Furthermore, present in Romania will be Professor John Taylor, member of the group of economic advisers to the U.S. President, and Richard Schifter, U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights, who carries a message of friendship to the Romanian Government on behalf of Mr. James Baker.

### Radio Analyzes Results of Croatian Elections

*LD3004213290 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] According to the latest information from the Croat Electoral Commission, 38 out of the total of 53, or 71.7 percent, of the deputies elected to the Croat Assembly's Chamber of Municipalities are from the Croat Democratic Community [Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ]; 24 out of the total of 28, or 85.7 percent, of deputies elected to the Sociopolitical Chamber come from the HDZ; and 41 out of the total of 50, or 82 percent, of the deputies in the Chamber of Associated Labor come from the HDZ. This means that out of all the deputies elected so far, 78.6 percent come from the HDZ, 9.92 percent from the Croat League of Communists-Party of Democratic Changes, and 11.48 percent from all other parties.

### Serbian Interior Minister Discusses Kosovo

*AU3004200690 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 90 p 6*

[Report on interview with Radmilo Bogdanovic, republican secretary for internal affairs of Serbia, by Savo Popovic; place and date not given: "The Rule of Law Has Started To Function"]

[Excerpts] We learned from the statement issued by the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia last week that the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs has carried out the Serbian Presidency's order and taken over part of the state and public security in Kosovo. This was followed by the Serbian Presidency's proposal that the state of emergency be lifted, which was indeed done (by the SFRY Presidency). Considering these two things together, we asked Radmilo Bogdanovic, republican secretary for internal affairs of Serbia, whether "taking over affairs" in Kosovo means the suspension of the provincial internal affairs bodies.

"No, they have not been suspended," Bogdanovic replied. "The Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs has taken over the responsibility for carrying out the key duties.

"As regards the state security, this means, above all, curbing intelligence work, a struggle against the enemy from outside and inside, and the work on uncovering the organizers of separatist demonstrations."

[Popovic] What about public security?

[Bogdanovic] Considering that we are legally authorized to take over some public security duties, we have decided to take this step after what happened in Vucitrn and Podujevo. The criminal acts that pose a danger to the equality of the peoples, nationalities, and ethnic groups are now under our jurisdiction, as is the fight against the smuggling of drugs, arms, and ammunition, and the prevention of the most complicated activities carried out with the intent to damage social property. For this purpose, we have formed 33 special units. Two units have been formed to control the safety of traffic in the province and across state borders. We have also formed two operative and expert groups to prevent the most complicated criminal acts concerning social property, smuggling, and the disturbance of public peace and order of greater proportions. [passage omitted]

[Popovic] Who made decisions regarding the composition of these special units?

[Bogdanovic] The republican secretary, according to the law. These units consist of a certain number of experts and senior members of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Serbia and the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Vojvodina. A few former workers of the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Kosovo have also been hired.

[Popovic] Why only a few?

[Bogdanovic] We did not hire 80 or so people simply because there is no work for them, or because they were not qualified or suitable enough. They remain available to the provincial secretariat for other work. [passage omitted]

[Popovic] What is being done at present to make the rule of law start to function in Kosovo?

[Bogdanovic] Regarding public peace and order and the safety of personal and general property, the situation in Kosovo is presently quiet. In the last 20 or so days, since we took over part of the work here, we filed 812 criminal charges, of which 773 are in the category of general crime, 13 of economic crime, and 26 of political crime. [passage omitted]

[Popovic] What about the organizers and initiators?

[Bogdanovic] One of the most important tasks at present is to find those who organized "poisoning," those who strive for a "Kosovo—republic," and those who advocate armed and other types of resistance with the aim of seceding from Yugoslavia. In doing this, we expect the cooperation of all citizens of Kosovo, not only of Serbs and Montenegrin, but, above all, of Albanians. The first results have already been achieved.

[Popovic] Is there still a need for the joint militia unit to be in Kosovo?

[Bogdanovic] Yes, there still is because the unit is here for preventive and operational purposes, as well as for intervention in order to curb demonstrations if they take place. [passage omitted]

[Popovic] Has the correct number of immigrants been established, and what happened with that number of 300,000 immigrants that recently has been publicly mentioned on several occasions?

[Bogdanovic] We will arrive at a precise number of immigrants through our work in the field because some

records (dating to the pre-1968 period) were destroyed and some were never kept. However, it is certain that there are no 300,000 immigrants.

### Pucnik Discusses Communists, Kucan

*LD3004163190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1445 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Belgrade, April 30 (TANJUG)—"The communists no longer pose any threat to Slovenia. They are slowly turning into a normal political party," Dr Joze Pucnik, leader of the Demos [Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia] coalition which won the recent parliamentary elections in the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia, has stated.

Dr Pucnik, who lost the recent elections for Slovenia's president to Milan Kucan, former leader of the Slovene Communists, said in an interview published in the Belgrade illustrated review SVET that the communists no longer resorted to repression, no longer usurped the state, as if it was their own private property, and no longer plundered public property and violated human and moral rights.

Dr Pucnik said that Slovenia's president-elect Milan Kucan had changed the party's name and symbol but did not know what direction his party and the Republic of Slovenia were to take.

Dr Pucnik said that he was not for Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia but for its full sovereignty within Yugoslavia, which he said implied the republic's own monetary and fiscal policies.

### Macedonian-Serbian Conflict Viewed

*AU3004195890 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 29 Apr 90 p 4*

[Georgi Georgiev article: "Lazar Kolisevski's 'Hot Tin Roof'"]

[Text] "The dirty propaganda war" between Serbia and Macedonia, as they already call it in Skopje, is becoming increasingly fierce. The League of Communists [LC] of Macedonia leadership is subject to a violent campaign by the Serbian mass media that are under the control of the LC of Serbia. This campaign is aimed at politically discrediting the league, at introducing a split into the LC of Macedonia, and at an "internal party coup" to reinstate Lazar Kolisevski (Lazar Panev Kolishev), the most "Serbian Macedonian," to power. The truth is that people in Belgrade and the members of certain political circles in Skopje, which were in power until recently, cannot resign themselves to the new Macedonian party leadership's efforts to take advantage of the movement for democracy and reforms for a certain alleviation of the Macedonians' total subordination to and dependence upon the Serbian party leadership and to Serbian national interests.

The relatively objective daily BORBA wrote as follows in this connection: "It is no secret that the 'Macedonian democratic wave' actually represents a 'hot tin roof' for those who for several decades proclaimed even the most timid democratic movement as 'Sharlovism' (named after Sharlo-Metodi Shatarov—leader of the Macedonian Bulgarian Communists in the armed struggle against fascism, who was declared a 'traitor' of the Macedonian cause in Skopje and killed under mysterious circumstances—DUMA editorial note) and as 'Bulgarianism,' namely 'anticommunism.' Today, however, the exponents of the 'democratic wave' are accused of being 'pro-Slovene destroyers of Yugoslavia.' Thus, the internal Macedonian process of transforming the 'party-police regime' into a rule-of-law state is involved in the game of internal Yugoslav confrontation. On the other hand, exponents of the old state-party monopoly, who have long since become the 'new class,' are posing as guardians of 'Serbian interests in Macedonia'," BORBA points out.

However, this sounds like an euphemism compared with the accusations of "Bulgarianism," or of "pro-Bulgarian policy." At a rally in Smederovo, 300 of the 3,000 resident Macedonians chanted slogans accusing LC of Macedonia Chairman Petar Gosev of being Shatarov's heir. Gosev himself, at a meeting with the party aktiv in Prilep, complained that he had been accused of "anti-Serbian" and "pro-Bulgarian" policy, according to the daily NOVA MAKEDONIJA. He said as follows in response to the accusations: "Unity cannot be implemented by means of an authoritarian ideology as a prerequisite for the totalitarian form of unanimity. Such an ideology takes advantage of the concept of unity as a means of exercising pressure and domination for the purpose of imposing the diktat of separatist interests."

The noisy efforts of the Serbian leadership, with the assistance of POLITIKA and all other Serbian dailies, in trying to restore the subordination of the Macedonian leadership to Serbia and to the Serbian national interests are implemented even with the help of overt falsifications, according to the Yugoslav mass media. In connection with a poll organized by Belgrade, asking the members of the already split League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] whether they favor resuming the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress—interrupted in January 1990—it turned out that many Macedonian Communists who were cited by the Serbian press had not even seen the investigators of the poll, and some statements by Macedonians that were cited were reportedly attributed to people who were already dead.

There was another result that the Serbian party and state leadership had hardly expected. Instead of becoming an object of sharp criticism for the numerous opposition parties that recently emerged in Macedonia, the LC of Macedonia actually obtained their support in its conflict with Serbia, and this fact can be easily explained: It was the first time in almost 50 years that the Macedonian

Communists dared to publicly react against the total domination of the ruling pro-Serbian, Macedonian party upper crust.

Professor Djordje Marjanovic, the Macedonian Democrats' leader, already declared that the "fate of Macedonia—namely the question of whether Macedonia should become a state equal to Serbia, or should remain nothing but its fourth province—is at stake in this conflict."

Ante Popovski, the Movement for All-Macedonian Action leader, declared that "the most conservative method of pressure, characteristic of the hardest struggles in Stalin's era," was applied by Serbia in its relations with Macedonia.

Within the LC of Macedonia, the internal struggles between "conservatives" and "reformers" continue. Milan Pancevski, the former chairman of the LC of Macedonia Central Committee Presidency who was dismissed from the LC of Macedonia leadership, reportedly, continues to consider democratic changes as unnecessary, while the LCY leadership up to the last moment (prior to the 14th LCY Extraordinary Congress) resisted political pluralism and declared itself in favor of the so-called "direct socialist democracy" under which no direct elections whatsoever took place throughout Yugoslavia's entire postwar history.

It can be presumed that the "attempted party coup" by the "rebellion" of the Kumanovo party organization's leadership, organized by pro-Serbian Macedonians against the LC of Macedonia Central Committee, was a total failure and that the election of Macedonian Communists "in support of reforms" is irrevocable.

## Macedonia's Gosev Addresses Rifts in LCY

*AU3004173890 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21-22 Apr 90 p 5*

[Interview with Petar Gosev, president of the Central Committee Presidium of the League of Communists of Macedonia, by Dragan Nikolic; place and date not given: "The Devil Among Party Souls"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Nikolic] There is the view that you have joined the "northwestern" coalition.

[Gosev] There will always be views that have nothing whatsoever to do with reality. They are only partly the result of insufficient information or a superficial view of things and are, more significantly, the product of the conscious promotion of half-truths and untruths, so that at any given moment pressure can be exerted for "promoting one's own option." Those who want to make an objective judgment clearly see that we have our own positions and our own concept of social reform. In this concept, we do, of course, have positions that are identical to the positions that are supported by comrades in Slovenia, and we have positions that are identical to those in other republics, just as we have positions that do not correspond to any others.

[Nikolic] You have had talks with the leadership of the League of Communists [LC] of Slovenia. It was announced that your views are identical in many respects....

[Gosev] We have identical views as regards the reform of the economic system and the basic direction of the political system's reform. [passage omitted]

Regarding differences, these are obvious in the following issues: We are clearly committed to a federal structure for Yugoslavia, therefore for a modern federal state, while comrades in Slovenia—as you know—advocate a confederal status for Slovenia or a confederal Yugoslavia. We support a unified Yugoslav People's Army, and comrades in Slovenia have some different views that are familiar to you. We also view questions connected with Kosovo in different ways, even though we were convinced that, as regards the LC of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Reforms, they have not been sufficiently understood concerning this issue.

### A Confederation Is Not a State

[Nikolic] Why do you support a federal and not a confederal structure for the country when the confederation is usually said to be a defense from the "assault of unitarian counterrevolution"?

[Gosev] The introduction of a confederal structure really would mean the end of the new Yugoslavia with consequences for all the federal units that at this moment are and are not completely foreseeable, but are in any case dangerously negative. A confederation is not a state and even less a unified state. This is an accord, with greater or fewer points of agreement between totally sovereign states, that can be destroyed at any time either by the whole or by one side. Confederal bodies are not state bodies but interstate bodies, and it is known how they are constituted and how they function. When I say this, I have in mind the legal (pure) concept of a confederation and not some "in-between provisions."

There is no room in this pure interpretation of the confederation for a federal state, for a federal judiciary, for a unified foreign policy, or for a unified defense function for the country. There is also no room for a unified economic and political system. In other words, to repeat, in this case there would be no Yugoslav state. If everything is thus, then the economic and political consequences are quite tangible. [passage omitted]

We cannot create the country's unity with a unitarian concept, and, therefore, we also reject separatist and unitarian concepts of determining relations on Yugoslav territory. With their national characteristics and feelings, people cannot simply be reduced to pure mathematical expressions—they cannot simply be added and subtracted—and state and political offices and bodies cannot be set up on the basis of this logic. If the system

is unable to satisfy individual and collective interests and if it does not reduce and resolve economic and political conflicts in a satisfactory democratic way, ideological and emotive speeches about unity and mere calls to altruism will not disentangle the Yugoslav interethnic Gordian knot. At this moment, we need a lot of patience, reasoned talks, and a cool and reasonable assessment of everything possible.

[Nikolic] Some people think that you are not quite clear on the status of the Yugoslav People's Army.

[Gosev] [passage omitted] Despite the fact that we have presented and recorded our positions and my personal positions several times, I am very grateful to you for asking this question so that I can once again repeat: We support a unified Yugoslav People's Army with a unified system of command and with stable sources of finance in line with the possibilities and needs of the necessary increase in its combat readiness. Under conditions of multiparty political pluralism, the Yugoslav People's Army can only be a suprapolitical entity and not an army of one or another party but an army of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities. [passage omitted]

[Nikolic] Was the letter of the "remains" of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] Presidium really concealed from the Macedonian Communists?

[Gosev] These claims are strange to say the least. We could not conceal it as it was not sent to us for distribution to the membership. For the authors of this letter, we, as the leadership of republican organizations (on the basis of this letter), do not exist. They did not communicate with us, and really I do not understand what they are accusing us of. I read in POLITIKA publications that I used bureaucratic methods to ban it from being published in the media. I did not know that I had so much power. Apart from that, you, Dragan Nikolic, know that NOVA MAKEDONIJA published the letter as soon as it received it, together with the voting form. However, apart from this, we did a lot to publicize it. We consulted with all communal organizations and held a session of the LC of Macedonia Central Committee [CC] to discuss this letter. We could not have done more.

[Nikolic] Did the LC of Macedonia CC have the right to take a stand on the letter?

[Gosev] We did not think it was necessary to ask for permission from anyone to do this.

[Nikolic] What has been Milan Pancevski's role in the present events in the LC of Macedonia?

[Gosev] We talked about him at the last session of the LC of Macedonia CC, after most of the LC of Macedonia had discussed him. We no longer want to be preoccupied with this. He himself has said the most about his role. [passage omitted]

[Nikolic] Does the LC of Macedonia face a schism, or has a schism already happened?

[Gosev] It neither faces a schism, nor will a schism occur. Individuals come and go from the LC of Macedonia. There has recently been greater interest in joining the LC of Macedonia.

[Nikolic] Do you have the support of the grass roots?

[Gosev] To judge by some papers, we do not. In fact, we have support like rarely before. Anyway, you are a living witness to events in Macedonia, so tell your colleagues what you think about it.

[Nikolic] Will you resign?

[Gosev] If those who elected us ask for this, we will without objection.

**Dangerous Boomerang Games**

[Nikolic] Why did you not take part in the work of the last session of the LCY CC?

[Gosev] We have already said this several times. We spoke about this in detail at the last (fourth) session of the LC of Macedonia CC. However, I will briefly reiterate this. First, because of the irrefutable fact that this could not be a regular session of the LCY CC for the simple reason that it was known in advance that members from two republican organizations (the LC of Croatia and the LC of Slovenia) would not be attending. Under these conditions, any decision is unstatutory and, what is more important, because of the political circumstances, the body in this composition cannot be the leadership of Yugoslav Communists. Second, at preparatory meetings in Belgrade, we did not reach agreement on what the results of the session would be, I mean some minimal positive outcome. The warnings and stands of the LC of Bosnia-Hercegovina CC Presidium, the LC of Croatia CC Presidium, and the LC of Macedonia CC Presidium were simply rejected and outvoted.

Under such conditions, we foresaw that this session would not only be yet another disgrace for the LCY as a political organization but an event that would further stimulate political and interethnic tensions in the country. We did not, of course, want to participate in this and particularly not under conditions whereby someone did not care what the LC of Macedonia and another two or three republican organizations thought or whereby their views are eliminated through outvoting and the single-minded disciplining of parts of the LCY. It was as if the main aim of the session was to carry out "differentiation" in the LCY as regards "Yugoslavs and non-Yugoslavs" "before the public." The method and outcome of this differentiation is well known, although I do not know if the main proponents of these intentions could be satisfied with this. [passage omitted]

**Border Protest Over Currency Regulations**

*LD3004111590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0903 GMT 30 Apr 90*

[Text] Sofia, April 30 (TANJUG)—A Bulgarian citizen yesterday caused an incident on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border crossing at Kalotina when he tried to prevent Yugoslavs from entering Bulgaria by obstructing them with his car.

The Bulgarian news agency BTA reported that the act was a sign of protest by a group of Bulgarian, Soviet, Polish and Romanian citizens who had been denied permission to enter Yugoslavia without the obligatory exchange of 200 dollars.

After being unable to prove to Yugoslav customs officials that they were "travellers in transit through Yugoslavia," the East European citizens ended their two-hour protest and drove off towards other border crossings, a Bulgarian customs official said.